zephyr/arch/x86/core
Leandro Pereira 16472cafcf arch: x86: Use retpolines in core assembly routines
In order to mitigate Spectre variant 2 (branch target injection), use
retpolines for indirect jumps and calls.

The newly-added hidden CONFIG_X86_NO_SPECTRE flag, which is disabled
by default, must be set by a x86 SoC if its CPU performs speculative
execution.  Most targets supported by Zephyr do not, so this is
set to "y" by default.

A new setting, CONFIG_RETPOLINE, has been added to the "Security
Options" sections, and that will be enabled by default if
CONFIG_X86_NO_SPECTRE is disabled.

Signed-off-by: Leandro Pereira <leandro.pereira@intel.com>
2018-04-24 04:00:01 +05:30
..
offsets debug: remove DEBUG_INFO option 2018-02-12 13:58:28 -08:00
CMakeLists.txt debug: remove DEBUG_INFO option 2018-02-12 13:58:28 -08:00
Kconfig x86: remove HAS_DTS checking 2018-01-29 10:38:32 -06:00
cache.c
cache_s.S
cpuhalt.c
crt0.S cleanup: remove nanokernel/nano leftovers 2017-12-05 09:44:23 -06:00
excstub.S arch: x86: Use retpolines in core assembly routines 2018-04-24 04:00:01 +05:30
fatal.c arch: x86: Unwind the stack on fatal errors 2018-03-16 14:12:15 -07:00
float.c
intstub.S arch: x86: Use retpolines in core assembly routines 2018-04-24 04:00:01 +05:30
irq_manage.c cleanup: replace old jira numbers with GH issues 2018-03-26 13:13:04 -04:00
irq_offload.c
msr.c
reboot_rst_cnt.c
swap.S arch: x86: Use retpolines in core assembly routines 2018-04-24 04:00:01 +05:30
sys_fatal_error_handler.c
thread.c x86: fix logic for thread wrappers 2018-03-16 14:12:15 -07:00
userspace.S arch: x86: Use retpolines in core assembly routines 2018-04-24 04:00:01 +05:30
x86_mmu.c kernel: mem_domain: Add to current thread should configure immediately. 2017-12-21 11:52:27 -08:00