/* * Copyright (c) 2019 Intel Corporation. * * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 */ #ifndef ZEPHYR_MISC_SPECULATION_H #define ZEPHYR_MISC_SPECULATION_H #include /** * Sanitize an array index against bounds check bypass attacks aka the * Spectre V1 vulnerability. * * CPUs with speculative execution may speculate past any size checks and * leak confidential data due to analysis of micro-architectural properties. * This will unconditionally truncate any out-of-bounds indexes to * zero in the speculative execution path using bit twiddling instead of * any branch instructions. * * Example usage: * * if (index < size) { * index = k_array_index_sanitize(index, size); * data = array[index]; * } * * @param index Untrusted array index which has been validated, but not used * @param array_size Size of the array * @return The original index value if < size, or 0 */ static inline u32_t k_array_index_sanitize(u32_t index, u32_t array_size) { #ifdef CONFIG_BOUNDS_CHECK_BYPASS_MITIGATION s32_t signed_index = index, signed_array_size = array_size; /* Take the difference between index and max. * A proper value will result in a negative result. We also AND in * the complement of index, so that we automatically reject any large * indexes which would wrap around the difference calculation. * * Sign-extend just the sign bit to produce a mask of all 1s (accept) * or all 0s (truncate). */ u32_t mask = ((signed_index - signed_array_size) & ~signed_index) >> 31; return index & mask; #else ARG_UNUSED(array_size); return index; #endif /* CONFIG_BOUNDS_CHECK_BYPASS_MITIGATION */ } #endif /* ZEPHYR_MISC_SPECULATION_H */