Commit Graph

27 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Daniel Leung d736af8d26 x86: implements arch_thread_priv_stack_space_get
This implements arch_thread_priv_stack_space_get() so this can
be used to figure out how much privileged stack space is used.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Leung <daniel.leung@intel.com>
2024-08-28 06:50:30 -04:00
Daniel Leung fb0babacee x86: initialize privileged stack during thread init
This adds the bits to initialize the privileged stack for
each thread during thread initialization. This prevents
information leaking if the thread stack is reused, and
also aids in calculating stack space usage during system
calls.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Leung <daniel.leung@intel.com>
2024-08-28 06:50:30 -04:00
Daniel Leung c25fa96a68 x86: only set psp pointer for thread stacks
Only set the privileged stack pointer for thread stacks, but
nullify the pointer for kernel-only stacks, as these stacks
do not have the reserved space. The psp pointer may point to
arbitrary memory in this case if stack is not big enough.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Leung <daniel.leung@intel.com>
2024-08-28 06:50:30 -04:00
Daniel Leung 027a1c30cd x86: add support for memory mapped stack for threads
This adds the necessary bits to enable memory mapping thread
stacks on both x86 and x86_64. Note that currently these do
not support multi level mappings (e.g. demand paging and
running in virtual address space: qemu_x86/atom/virt board)
as the mapped stacks require actual physical addresses.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Leung <daniel.leung@intel.com>
2024-04-10 07:44:27 -04:00
Daniel Leung ac5835565b x86: synchronize usage of CONFIG_X86_STACK_PROTECTION
Most places use CONFIG_X86_STACK_PROTECTION, but there are some
places using CONFIG_HW_STACK_PROTECTION. So synchronize all
to use CONFIG_X86_STACK_PROTECTION instead.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Leung <daniel.leung@intel.com>
2024-04-10 07:44:27 -04:00
Daniel Leung d34351d994 kernel: align thread stack size declaration
When thread stack is defined as an array, K_THREAD_STACK_LEN()
is used to calculate the size for each stack in the array.
However, standalone thread stack has its size calculated by
Z_THREAD_STACK_SIZE_ADJUST() instead. Depending on the arch
alignment requirement, they may not be the same... which
could cause some confusions. So align them both to use
K_THREAD_STACK_LEN().

Signed-off-by: Daniel Leung <daniel.leung@intel.com>
2024-03-27 19:27:10 -04:00
Daniel Leung 9f4330f365 x86: use CONFIG_PRIVILEGED_STACK_SIZE for stack size
Instead of using CONFIG_MMU_PAGE_SIZE for size of the privileged
stack, use the actual kconfig CONFIG_PRIVILEGED_STACK_SIZE.
This allows for changing the size of privileged stack, and
also aligns to the usage of CONFIG_PRIVILEGED_STACK_SIZE.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Leung <daniel.leung@intel.com>
2024-03-08 09:37:36 +01:00
Daniel Leung 40ba4015e3 kernel: mm: only include demand_paging.h if needed
This moves including of demand_paging.h out of kernel/mm.h,
so that users of demand paging APIs must include the header
explicitly. Since the main user is kernel itself, we can be
more discipline about header inclusion.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Leung <daniel.leung@intel.com>
2023-11-23 10:01:45 +01:00
Anas Nashif 4e396174ce kernel: move syscall_handler.h to internal include directory
Move the syscall_handler.h header, used internally only to a dedicated
internal folder that should not be used outside of Zephyr.

Signed-off-by: Anas Nashif <anas.nashif@intel.com>
2023-11-03 11:46:52 +01:00
Gerard Marull-Paretas 16811660ee arch: migrate includes to <zephyr/...>
In order to bring consistency in-tree, migrate all arch code to the new
prefix <zephyr/...>. Note that the conversion has been scripted, refer
to zephyrproject-rtos#45388 for more details.

Signed-off-by: Gerard Marull-Paretas <gerard.marull@nordicsemi.no>
2022-05-06 19:57:22 +02:00
Nazar Kazakov f483b1bc4c everywhere: fix typos
Fix a lot of typos

Signed-off-by: Nazar Kazakov <nazar.kazakov.work@gmail.com>
2022-03-18 13:24:08 -04:00
Daniel Leung 7605619c1e x86: userspace: page in stack before starting user thread
If generic section is not present at boot, the thread stack
may not be in physical memory. Unconditionally page in the stack
instead of relying on page fault to speed up a little bit
on starting the thread.

Also, this prevents a double fault during thread setup when
setting up stack permission in z_x86_userspace_enter().

Signed-off-by: Daniel Leung <daniel.leung@intel.com>
2021-08-26 21:16:22 -04:00
Daniel Leung 2c2d313cb9 x86: ia32: mark symbols for boot and pinned regions
This marks code and data within x86/ia32 so they are going to
reside in boot and pinned regions. This is a step to enable
demand paging for whole kernel.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Leung <daniel.leung@intel.com>
2021-05-10 16:00:43 -05:00
Andy Ross cce5ff1510 arch/x86: Fix stack alignment for user threads
The x86_64 SysV ABI requires 16 byte alignment for the stack pointer
during execution of normal code.  That means that on entry to an
ABI-compatible C function (which is reached via a CALL instruction
that pushes the return address) the RSP register must be MISaligned by
exactly 8 bytes.  The kernel mode thread setup got this right, but we
missed the equivalent condition in userspace entry.

The end result was a misaligned stack, which is surprisingly robust
for most use.  But recent toolchains have starting doing some more
elaborate vectorization, and the resulting SSE instructions started
failing in userspace on the misaliged loads.

Note that there's a comment about optimization: we're doing the stack
alignment in the "wrong place" and are needlessly wasting bytes in
some cases.  We should see the raw stack boundaries where we are
setting up RSP values.  Add a FIXME to this effect, but don't touch
anything as this patch is a targeted bugfix.

Also fix a somewhat embarassing 32-bit-ism that would have truncated
the address of a userspace stack that we tried to put above 4G.

Fixes #31018

Signed-off-by: Andy Ross <andrew.j.ross@intel.com>
2021-02-03 18:45:48 -05:00
Andrew Boie d2a72273b7 x86: add support for common page tables
We provide an option for low-memory systems to use a single set
of page tables for all threads. This is only supported if
KPTI and SMP are disabled. This configuration saves a considerable
amount of RAM, especially if multiple memory domains are used,
at a cost of context switching overhead.

Some caching techniques are used to reduce the amount of context
switch updates; the page tables aren't updated if switching to
a supervisor thread, and the page table configuration of the last
user thread switched in is cached.

Signed-off-by: Andrew Boie <andrew.p.boie@intel.com>
2020-11-05 09:33:40 -05:00
Andrew Boie b8242bff64 x86: move page tables to the memory domain level
- z_x86_userspace_enter() for both 32-bit and 64-bit now
  call into C code to clear the stack buffer and set the
  US bits in the page tables for the memory range.

- Page tables are now associated with memory domains,
  instead of having separate page tables per thread.
  A spinlock protects write access to these page tables,
  and read/write access to the list of active page
  tables.

- arch_mem_domain_init() implemented, allocating and
  copying page tables from the boot page tables.

- struct arch_mem_domain defined for x86. It has
  a page table link and also a list node for iterating
  over them.

Signed-off-by: Andrew Boie <andrew.p.boie@intel.com>
2020-11-05 09:33:40 -05:00
Andrew Boie d31f62a955 x86: smp: add TLB shootdown logic
This will be needed when we support memory un-mapping, or
the same user mode page tables on multiple CPUs. Neither
are implemented yet.

Signed-off-by: Andrew Boie <andrew.p.boie@intel.com>
2020-11-05 09:33:40 -05:00
Andrew Boie 507ebd541a x86: remove NULL check in arch_user_mode_enter
These days all threads are always a member of a memory domain,
remove this NULL check as it won't ever be false.

Signed-off-by: Andrew Boie <andrew.p.boie@intel.com>
2020-10-20 09:37:49 -07:00
Andrew Boie f6c64e92ce x86: fix arch_user_mode_enter locking
This function iterates over the thread's memory domain
and updates page tables based on it. We need to be holding
z_mem_domain_lock while this happens.

Signed-off-by: Andrew Boie <andrew.p.boie@intel.com>
2020-10-20 09:37:49 -07:00
Andrew Boie 7d32e9f9a5 mmu: support only identity RAM mapping
We no longer plan to support a split address space with
the kernel in high memory and per-process address spaces.
Because of this, we can simplify some things. System RAM
is now always identity mapped at boot.

We no longer require any virtual-to-physical translation
for page tables, and can remove the dual-mapping logic
from the page table generation script since we won't need
to transition the instruction point off of physical
addresses.

CONFIG_KERNEL_VM_BASE and CONFIG_KERNEL_VM_LIMIT
have been removed. The kernel's address space always
starts at CONFIG_SRAM_BASE_ADDRESS, of a fixed size
specified by CONFIG_KERNEL_VM_SIZE.

Driver MMIOs and other uses of k_mem_map() are still
virtually mapped, and the later introduction of demand
paging will result in only a subset of system RAM being
a fixed identity mapping instead of all of it.

Signed-off-by: Andrew Boie <andrew.p.boie@intel.com>
2020-09-03 14:24:38 -04:00
Andrew Boie 38e17b68e3 x86: paging code rewrite
The x86 paging code has been rewritten to support another paging mode
and non-identity virtual mappings.

 - Paging code now uses an array of paging level characteristics and
   walks tables using for loops. This is opposed to having different
   functions for every paging level and lots of #ifdefs. The code is
   now more concise and adding new paging modes should be trivial.

 - We now support 32-bit, PAE, and IA-32e page tables.

 - The page tables created by gen_mmu.py are now installed at early
   boot. There are no longer separate "flat" page tables. These tables
   are mutable at any time.

 - The x86_mmu code now has a private header. Many definitions that did
   not need to be in public scope have been moved out of mmustructs.h
   and either placed in the C file or in the private header.

 - Improvements to dumping page table information, with the physical
   mapping and flags all shown

 - arch_mem_map() implemented

 - x86 userspace/memory domain code ported to use the new
   infrastructure.

 - add logic for physical -> virtual instruction pointer transition,
   including cleaning up identity mappings after this takes place.

Signed-off-by: Andrew Boie <andrew.p.boie@intel.com>
2020-08-25 15:49:59 -04:00
Andrew Boie b0c155f3ca kernel: overhaul stack specification
The core kernel computes the initial stack pointer
for a thread, properly aligning it and subtracting out
any random offsets or thread-local storage areas.
arch_new_thread() no longer needs to make any calculations,
an initial stack frame may be placed at the bounds of
the new 'stack_ptr' parameter passed in. This parameter
replaces 'stack_size'.

thread->stack_info is now set before arch_new_thread()
is invoked, z_new_thread_init() has been removed.
The values populated may need to be adjusted on arches
which carve-out MPU guard space from the actual stack
buffer.

thread->stack_info now has a new member 'delta' which
indicates any offset applied for TLS or random offset.
It's used so the calculations don't need to be repeated
if the thread later drops to user mode.

CONFIG_INIT_STACKS logic is now performed inside
z_setup_new_thread(), before arch_new_thread() is called.

thread->stack_info is now defined as the canonical
user-accessible area within the stack object, including
random offsets and TLS. It will never include any
carved-out memory for MPU guards and must be updated at
runtime if guards are removed.

Available stack space is now optimized. Some arches may
need to significantly round up the buffer size to account
for page-level granularity or MPU power-of-two requirements.
This space is now accounted for and used by virtue of
the Z_THREAD_STACK_SIZE_ADJUST() call in z_setup_new_thread.

Signed-off-by: Andrew Boie <andrew.p.boie@intel.com>
2020-07-30 21:11:14 -04:00
Kumar Gala a1b77fd589 zephyr: replace zephyr integer types with C99 types
git grep -l 'u\(8\|16\|32\|64\)_t' | \
		xargs sed -i "s/u\(8\|16\|32\|64\)_t/uint\1_t/g"
	git grep -l 's\(8\|16\|32\|64\)_t' | \
		xargs sed -i "s/s\(8\|16\|32\|64\)_t/int\1_t/g"

Signed-off-by: Kumar Gala <kumar.gala@linaro.org>
2020-06-08 08:23:57 -05:00
Andrew Boie 618426d6e7 kernel: add Z_STACK_PTR_ALIGN ARCH_STACK_PTR_ALIGN
This operation is formally defined as rounding down a potential
stack pointer value to meet CPU and ABI requirments.

This was previously defined ad-hoc as STACK_ROUND_DOWN().

A new architecture constant ARCH_STACK_PTR_ALIGN is added.
Z_STACK_PTR_ALIGN() is defined in terms of it. This used to
be inconsistently specified as STACK_ALIGN or STACK_PTR_ALIGN;
in the latter case, STACK_ALIGN meant something else, typically
a required alignment for the base of a stack buffer.

STACK_ROUND_UP() only used in practice by Risc-V, delete
elsewhere.

Signed-off-by: Andrew Boie <andrew.p.boie@intel.com>
2020-04-21 18:45:45 -04:00
Andrew Boie e34f1cee06 x86: implement kernel page table isolation
Implement a set of per-cpu trampoline stacks which all
interrupts and exceptions will initially land on, and also
as an intermediate stack for privilege changes as we need
some stack space to swap page tables.

Set up the special trampoline page which contains all the
trampoline stacks, TSS, and GDT. This page needs to be
present in the user page tables or interrupts don't work.

CPU exceptions, with KPTI turned on, are treated as interrupts
and not traps so that we have IRQs locked on exception entry.

Add some additional macros for defining IDT entries.

Add special handling of locore text/rodata sections when
creating user mode page tables on x86-64.

Restore qemu_x86_64 to use KPTI, and remove restrictions on
enabling user mode on x86-64.

Signed-off-by: Andrew Boie <andrew.p.boie@intel.com>
2020-01-17 16:17:39 -05:00
Andrew Boie 708d5f7922 x86: don't use privilege stack areas as a guard
This is causing problems, as if we create a thread in
a system call we will *not* be using the kernel page
tables if CONFIG_KPTI=n.

Just don't fiddle with this page's permissions; we don't
need it as a guard area anyway since we have a stack
guard placed immediately before it, and this page
is unused if user mode isn't active.

Signed-off-by: Andrew Boie <andrew.p.boie@intel.com>
2020-01-13 16:35:10 -05:00
Andrew Boie 7f82b99ad4 x86: up-level some user mode functions
These are now common code, all are related to user mode
threads. The rat's nest of ifdefs in ia32's arch_new_thread
has been greatly simplified, there is now just one hook
if user mode is turned on.

Signed-off-by: Andrew Boie <andrew.p.boie@intel.com>
2020-01-13 16:35:10 -05:00