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## Rationale

To provide confidentiality of image data while in transport to the
device or while residing on an external flash, `MCUBoot` has support
for encrypting/decrypting images on-the-fly while upgrading.

The image header needs to flag this image as `ENCRYPTED` (0x04) and
a TLV with the key must be present in the image. When upgrading the
image from `slot1` to `slot0` it is automatically decrypted (after
validation). If swap upgrades are enabled, the image located in `slot0`,
also having the `ENCRYPTED` flag set and the TLV present, is
re-encrypted while swapping to `slot1`.

## Threat model

The encrypted image support is supposed to allow for confidentiality
if the image is not residing on the device or is written to external
storage, eg a SPI flash being used for slot1.

It does not protect against the possibility of attaching a JTAG and
reading the internal flash memory, or using some attack vector that
enables dumping the internal flash in any way.

Since decrypting requires a private key (or secret if using symetric
crypto) to reside inside the device, it is the responsibility of the
device manufacturer to guarantee that this key is already in the device
and not possible to extract.

## Design

When encrypting an image, only the payload (FW) is encrypted. The header,
TLVs are still sent as plain data.

Hashing and signing also remain functionally the same way as before,
applied over the un-encrypted data. Validation on encrypted images, checks
that the encrypted flag is set and TLV data is OK, then it decrypts each
image block before sending the data to the hash routines.

The image is encrypted using AES-CTR-128, with a counter that starts
from zero (over the payload blocks) and increments by 1 for each 16-byte
block. AES-CTR-128 was chosen for speed/simplicity and allowing for any
block to be encrypted/decrypted without requiring knowledge of any other
block (allowing for simple resume operations on swap interruptions).

The key used is a randomized when creating a new image, by `imgtool` or
`newt`. This key should never be reused and no checks are done for this,
but randomizing a 16-byte block with a TRNG should make it highly
improbable that duplicates ever happen.

To distribute this AES-CTR-128 key, new TLVs were defined. The key can be
encrypted using either RSA-OAEP or AES-KW-128. Also in the future support
for EICES (using EC) can be added.

For RSA-OAEP a new TLV with value `0x30` is added to the image, for
AES-KW-128 a new TLV with value `0x31` is added to the image. The contents
of both TLVs are the results of applying the given operations over the
AES-CTR-128 key.

## Upgrade process

When starting a new upgrade process, `MCUBoot` checks that the image in
`slot1` has the `ENCRYPTED` flag set and has the required TLV with the
encrypted key. It then uses its internal private/secret key to decrypt
the TLV containing the key. Given that no errors are found, it will then
start the validation process, decrypting the blocks before check. A good
image being determined, the upgrade consists in reading the blocks from
`slot1`, decrypting and writing to `slot0`.

If swap is used for the upgrade process, the encryption happens when
copying the sectors of `slot1` to the scratch area.

The `scratch` area is not encrypted, so it must reside in the internal
flash of the MCU to avoid attacks that could interrupt the upgrade and
dump the data.

Also when swap is used, the image in `slot0` is checked for presence of
the `ENCRYPTED` flag and the key TLV. If those are present the sectors
are re-encrypted when copying from `slot0` to `slot1`.

PS: Each encrypted image must have its own key TLV that should be unique
and used only for this particular image.

Also when swap method is employed, the sizes of both images are saved to
the status area just before starting the upgrade process, because it
would be very hard to determine this information when an interruption
occurs and the information is spread across multiple areas.

## Creating your keys

<!--
TODO: expand this section or add specific docs to imgtool, newt...

XXX: add current key access method (reverse direction from sign)
-->

* If using RSA-OAEP, generating a keypair follows steps similar to those
  described in [signed_images](signed_images.md)
* If using AES-KW-128 (`newt` only), the `kek` can be generated with a
  command like `dd if=/dev/urandom bs=1 count=16 | base64 > my_kek.b64`