2019-12-13 07:19:55 +08:00
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# ECDSA signature format
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When ECDSA SECP256R1 (EC256) signature support was added to MCUboot, a
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shortcut was taken, and these signatures were padded to make them
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always a fixed length. Unfortunately, this padding was done in a way
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that is not easily reversible. Some crypto libraries are fairly
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2021-10-20 21:36:45 +08:00
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strict about the formatting of the ECDSA signature (specifically, Mbed
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2019-12-13 07:19:55 +08:00
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TLS). This currently means that the ECDSA SECP224R1 (EC) signature
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checking code will fail to boot about 1 out of every 256 images,
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because the signature itself will end in a 0x00 byte, and the code
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will remove too much data, invalidating the signature.
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There are a couple of ways to fix this:
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1. Use a reversible padding scheme. This will work, but requires
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at least one pad byte always be added (to set the length). This
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padding would be somewhat incompatible across versions (older
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2021-10-20 21:27:16 +08:00
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EC256 would work, newer MCUboot code would reject old
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2019-12-13 07:19:55 +08:00
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signatures. EC code would only reliably work in the new
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combination).
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2. Remove the padding entirely. Depending on which tool, this will
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require some rethinking of how TLV generation is implemented so
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that the length does not need to be known until the signature is
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generated. These tools are all written in higher-level
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languages and this change should not be difficult.
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2019-12-18 07:08:33 +08:00
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However, this will also break compatibility with older versions,
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specifically in that images generated with newer tools will not
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2019-12-13 07:19:55 +08:00
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work with older versions of MCUboot.
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This document proposes a multi-stage approach, to give a transition
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period.
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2019-12-18 07:10:49 +08:00
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- First, add a `--no-pad-sig` argument to the sign command in
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2019-12-13 07:19:55 +08:00
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`imgtool.py`. Without this, the images will be padded with the
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existing scheme, and with the argument, the ecdsa will be encoded
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2019-12-18 07:10:49 +08:00
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without any padding. The `--pad-sig` argument will also be
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accepted, but this will initially be the default.
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2019-12-13 07:19:55 +08:00
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- MCUboot will be modified to allow unpadded signatures right away.
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The existing EC256 implementations will still work (with or
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without padding), and the existing EC implementation will begin
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2019-12-18 07:08:33 +08:00
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accepting padded and unpadded signatures.
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2019-12-13 07:19:55 +08:00
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2021-10-20 21:36:45 +08:00
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- An Mbed TLS implementation of EC256 can be added, but will require
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2019-12-18 07:10:49 +08:00
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the `--no-pad-sig` signature to be able to boot all generated
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2019-12-13 07:19:55 +08:00
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images (without the argument 3 of out 4 images generated will have
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padding, and be considered invalid).
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After one or more MCUboot release cycles, and announcements over
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2019-12-18 07:08:33 +08:00
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relevant channels, the arguments to `imgtool.py` will change:
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2019-12-13 07:19:55 +08:00
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2019-12-18 07:10:49 +08:00
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- `--no-pad-sig` will still be accepted, but have no effect.
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2019-12-13 07:19:55 +08:00
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2019-12-18 07:10:49 +08:00
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- `--pad-sig` will now bring back the old padding behavior.
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2019-12-13 07:19:55 +08:00
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2019-12-18 07:10:49 +08:00
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This will require a change to any scripts that are relying on a
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default, but not specifying a specific version of imgtool.
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2019-12-13 07:19:55 +08:00
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The signature generation in the simulator can be changed at the same
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time the boot code begins to accept unpadded signatures. The sim is
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2021-10-20 21:27:16 +08:00
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always run out of the same tree as the MCUboot code, so there should
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2019-12-13 07:19:55 +08:00
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not be any compatibility issues.
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## Background
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ECDSA signatures are encoded as ASN.1, notably with the signature
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itself being encoded as:
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ECDSA-Sig-Value ::= SEQUENCE {
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r INTEGER,
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s INTEGER
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}
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where both `r` and `s` are 256-bit numbers. Because these are
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unsigned numbers that are being encoded in ASN.1 as signed values, if
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the high bit of the number is set, the DER encoded representation will
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require 33 bytes instead of 32. This means that the length of the
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2019-12-18 07:08:33 +08:00
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signature will vary by a couple of bytes, depending on whether one of
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2019-12-13 07:19:55 +08:00
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both of these numbers has the high bit set.
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Originally, MCUboot added padding to the entire signature, and just
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2019-12-18 07:08:33 +08:00
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removed any trailing 0 bytes from the data block. This would be fine 255/256
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times, when the last byte of the signature was non-zero, but if the
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signature ended in a zero, it would remove too many bytes, and the
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signature would be considered invalid.
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The correct approach here is to accept that ECDSA signatures are
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variable length, and make sure that we can handle them as such.
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