Kirill A. Shutemov 6b025ec148 x86/tdx: Fix race between set_memory_encrypted() and load_unaligned_zeropad() ... [ Upstream commit 195edce08b ] tl;dr: There is a race in the TDX private<=>shared conversion code which could kill the TDX guest. Fix it by changing conversion ordering to eliminate the window. TDX hardware maintains metadata to track which pages are private and shared. Additionally, TDX guests use the guest x86 page tables to specify whether a given mapping is intended to be private or shared. Bad things happen when the intent and metadata do not match. So there are two thing in play: 1. "the page" -- the physical TDX page metadata 2. "the mapping" -- the guest-controlled x86 page table intent For instance, an unrecoverable exit to VMM occurs if a guest touches a private mapping that points to a shared physical page. In summary: * Private mapping => Private Page == OK (obviously) * Shared mapping => Shared Page == OK (obviously) * Private mapping => Shared Page == BIG BOOM! * Shared mapping => Private Page == OK-ish (It will read generate a recoverable #VE via handle_mmio()) Enter load_unaligned_zeropad(). It can touch memory that is adjacent but otherwise unrelated to the memory it needs to touch. It will cause one of those unrecoverable exits (aka. BIG BOOM) if it blunders into a shared mapping pointing to a private page. This is a problem when __set_memory_enc_pgtable() converts pages from shared to private. It first changes the mapping and second modifies the TDX page metadata. It's moving from: * Shared mapping => Shared Page == OK to: * Private mapping => Shared Page == BIG BOOM! This means that there is a window with a shared mapping pointing to a private page where load_unaligned_zeropad() can strike. Add a TDX handler for guest.enc_status_change_prepare(). This converts the page from shared to private *before* the page becomes private. This ensures that there is never a private mapping to a shared page. Leave a guest.enc_status_change_finish() in place but only use it for private=>shared conversions. This will delay updating the TDX metadata marking the page private until *after* the mapping matches the metadata. This also ensures that there is never a private mapping to a shared page. [ dhansen: rewrite changelog ] Fixes: 7dbde76316 ("x86/mm/cpa: Add support for TDX shared memory") Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230606095622.1939-3-kirill.shutemov%40linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>		2023-07-19 16:21:00 +02:00
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tdx	x86/tdx: Fix race between set_memory_encrypted() and load_unaligned_zeropad()	2023-07-19 16:21:00 +02:00
Makefile	x86/tdx: Detect running as a TDX guest in early boot	2022-04-07 08:27:50 -07:00
core.c	Intel Trust Domain Extensions	2022-05-23 17:51:12 -07:00