The Thread Control Structure (TCS) contains meta-data used by the
hardware to save and restore thread specific information when
entering/exiting the enclave. A TCS can be added to an initialized
enclave by first adding a new regular enclave page, initializing the
content of the new page from within the enclave, and then changing that
page's type to a TCS.
Support the initialization of a TCS from within the enclave.
The variable information needed that should be provided from outside
the enclave is the address of the TCS, address of the State Save Area
(SSA), and the entry point that the thread should use to enter the
enclave. With this information provided all needed fields of a TCS
can be initialized.
Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/bad6052056188bde753a54313da1ac8f1e29088a.1652137848.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com
The test enclave (test_encl.elf) is built with two initialized
Thread Control Structures (TCS) included in the binary. Both TCS are
initialized with the same entry point, encl_entry, that correctly
computes the absolute address of the stack based on the stack of each
TCS that is also built into the binary.
A new TCS can be added dynamically to the enclave and requires to be
initialized with an entry point used to enter the enclave. Since the
existing entry point, encl_entry, assumes that the TCS and its stack
exists at particular offsets within the binary it is not able to handle
a dynamically added TCS and its stack.
Introduce a new entry point, encl_dyn_entry, that initializes the
absolute address of that thread's stack to the address immediately
preceding the TCS itself. It is now possible to dynamically add a
contiguous memory region to the enclave with the new stack preceding
the new TCS. With the new TCS initialized with encl_dyn_entry as entry
point the absolute address of the stack is computed correctly on entry.
Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/93e9c420dedf5f773ba6965c18245bc7d62aca83.1652137848.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com
Enclave pages can be added to an initialized enclave when an address
belonging to the enclave but without a backing page is accessed from
within the enclave.
Accessing memory without a backing enclave page from within an enclave
can be in different ways:
1) Pre-emptively run ENCLU[EACCEPT]. Since the addition of a page
always needs to be accepted by the enclave via ENCLU[EACCEPT] this
flow is efficient since the first execution of ENCLU[EACCEPT]
triggers the addition of the page and when execution returns to the
same instruction the second execution would be successful as an
acceptance of the page.
2) A direct read or write. The flow where a direct read or write
triggers the page addition execution cannot resume from the
instruction (read/write) that triggered the fault but instead
the enclave needs to be entered at a different entry point to
run needed ENCLU[EACCEPT] before execution can return to the
original entry point and the read/write instruction that faulted.
Add tests for both flows.
Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/0c321e0e32790ac1de742ce5017a331e6d902ac1.1652137848.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com
EPCM permission changes could be made from within (to relax
permissions) or out (to restrict permissions) the enclave. Kernel
support is needed when permissions are restricted to be able to
call the privileged ENCLS[EMODPR] instruction. EPCM permissions
can be relaxed via ENCLU[EMODPE] from within the enclave but the
enclave still depends on the kernel to install PTEs with the needed
permissions.
Add a test that exercises a few of the enclave page permission flows:
1) Test starts with a RW (from enclave and kernel perspective)
enclave page that is mapped via a RW VMA.
2) Use the SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESTRICT_PERMISSIONS ioctl() to restrict
the enclave (EPCM) page permissions to read-only.
3) Run ENCLU[EACCEPT] from within the enclave to accept the new page
permissions.
4) Attempt to write to the enclave page from within the enclave - this
should fail with a page fault on the EPCM permissions since the page
table entry continues to allow RW access.
5) Restore EPCM permissions to RW by running ENCLU[EMODPE] from within
the enclave.
6) Attempt to write to the enclave page from within the enclave - this
should succeed since both EPCM and PTE permissions allow this access.
Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/2617bf2b2d1e27ca1d0096e1192ae5896baf3f80.1652137848.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com
Enclave runtime management is introduced following the pattern
of the section describing enclave building. Provide a brief
summary of enclave runtime management, pointing to the functions
implementing the ioctl()s that will contain details within their
kernel-doc.
Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1da0b9a938b28e68e6870ebd5291490d680e700b.1652137848.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com
The page reclaimer ensures availability of EPC pages across all
enclaves. In support of this it runs independently from the
individual enclaves in order to take locks from the different
enclaves as it writes pages to swap.
When needing to load a page from swap an EPC page needs to be
available for its contents to be loaded into. Loading an existing
enclave page from swap does not reclaim EPC pages directly if
none are available, instead the reclaimer is woken when the
available EPC pages are found to be below a watermark.
When iterating over a large number of pages in an oversubscribed
environment there is a race between the reclaimer woken up and
EPC pages reclaimed fast enough for the page operations to proceed.
Ensure there are EPC pages available before attempting to load
a page that may potentially be pulled from swap into an available
EPC page.
Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/a0d8f037c4a075d56bf79f432438412985f7ff7a.1652137848.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com
The SGX2 page removal flow was introduced in previous patch and is
as follows:
1) Change the type of the pages to be removed to SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TRIM
using the ioctl() SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPES introduced in
previous patch.
2) Approve the page removal by running ENCLU[EACCEPT] from within
the enclave.
3) Initiate actual page removal using the ioctl()
SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_REMOVE_PAGES introduced here.
Support the final step of the SGX2 page removal flow with ioctl()
SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_REMOVE_PAGES. With this ioctl() the user specifies
a page range that should be removed. All pages in the provided
range should have the SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TRIM page type and the request
will fail with EPERM (Operation not permitted) if a page that does
not have the correct type is encountered. Page removal can fail
on any page within the provided range. Support partial success by
returning the number of pages that were successfully removed.
Since actual page removal will succeed even if ENCLU[EACCEPT] was not
run from within the enclave the ENCLU[EMODPR] instruction with RWX
permissions is used as a no-op mechanism to ensure ENCLU[EACCEPT] was
successfully run from within the enclave before the enclave page is
removed.
If the user omits running SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_REMOVE_PAGES the pages will
still be removed when the enclave is unloaded.
Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Haitao Huang <haitao.huang@intel.com>
Tested-by: Vijay Dhanraj <vijay.dhanraj@intel.com>
Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/b75ee93e96774e38bb44a24b8e9bbfb67b08b51b.1652137848.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com
Every enclave contains one or more Thread Control Structures (TCS). The
TCS contains meta-data used by the hardware to save and restore thread
specific information when entering/exiting the enclave. With SGX1 an
enclave needs to be created with enough TCSs to support the largest
number of threads expecting to use the enclave and enough enclave pages
to meet all its anticipated memory demands. In SGX1 all pages remain in
the enclave until the enclave is unloaded.
SGX2 introduces a new function, ENCLS[EMODT], that is used to change
the type of an enclave page from a regular (SGX_PAGE_TYPE_REG) enclave
page to a TCS (SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TCS) page or change the type from a
regular (SGX_PAGE_TYPE_REG) or TCS (SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TCS)
page to a trimmed (SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TRIM) page (setting it up for later
removal).
With the existing support of dynamically adding regular enclave pages
to an initialized enclave and changing the page type to TCS it is
possible to dynamically increase the number of threads supported by an
enclave.
Changing the enclave page type to SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TRIM is the first step
of dynamically removing pages from an initialized enclave. The complete
page removal flow is:
1) Change the type of the pages to be removed to SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TRIM
using the SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPES ioctl() introduced here.
2) Approve the page removal by running ENCLU[EACCEPT] from within
the enclave.
3) Initiate actual page removal using the ioctl() introduced in the
following patch.
Add ioctl() SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPES to support changing SGX
enclave page types within an initialized enclave. With
SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPES the user specifies a page range and the
enclave page type to be applied to all pages in the provided range.
The ioctl() itself can return an error code based on failures
encountered by the kernel. It is also possible for SGX specific
failures to be encountered. Add a result output parameter to
communicate the SGX return code. It is possible for the enclave page
type change request to fail on any page within the provided range.
Support partial success by returning the number of pages that were
successfully changed.
After the page type is changed the page continues to be accessible
from the kernel perspective with page table entries and internal
state. The page may be moved to swap. Any access until ENCLU[EACCEPT]
will encounter a page fault with SGX flag set in error code.
Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Haitao Huang <haitao.huang@intel.com>
Tested-by: Vijay Dhanraj <vijay.dhanraj@intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/babe39318c5bf16fc65fbfb38896cdee72161575.1652137848.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com
Before an enclave is initialized the enclave's memory range is unknown.
The enclave's memory range is learned at the time it is created via the
SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_CREATE ioctl() where the provided memory range is
obtained from an earlier mmap() of /dev/sgx_enclave. After an enclave
is initialized its memory can be mapped into user space (mmap()) from
where it can be entered at its defined entry points.
With the enclave's memory range known after it is initialized there is
no reason why it should be possible to map memory outside this range.
Lock down access to the initialized enclave's memory range by denying
any attempt to map memory outside its memory range.
Locking down the memory range also makes adding pages to an initialized
enclave more efficient. Pages are added to an initialized enclave by
accessing memory that belongs to the enclave's memory range but not yet
backed by an enclave page. If it is possible for user space to map
memory that does not form part of the enclave then an access to this
memory would eventually fail. Failures range from a prompt general
protection fault if the access was an ENCLU[EACCEPT] from within the
enclave, or a page fault via the vDSO if it was another access from
within the enclave, or a SIGBUS (also resulting from a page fault) if
the access was from outside the enclave.
Disallowing invalid memory to be mapped in the first place avoids
preventable failures.
Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/6391460d75ae79cea2e81eef0f6ffc03c6e9cfe7.1652137848.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com
With SGX1 an enclave needs to be created with its maximum memory demands
allocated. Pages cannot be added to an enclave after it is initialized.
SGX2 introduces a new function, ENCLS[EAUG], that can be used to add
pages to an initialized enclave. With SGX2 the enclave still needs to
set aside address space for its maximum memory demands during enclave
creation, but all pages need not be added before enclave initialization.
Pages can be added during enclave runtime.
Add support for dynamically adding pages to an initialized enclave,
architecturally limited to RW permission at creation but allowed to
obtain RWX permissions after trusted enclave runs EMODPE. Add pages
via the page fault handler at the time an enclave address without a
backing enclave page is accessed, potentially directly reclaiming
pages if no free pages are available.
The enclave is still required to run ENCLU[EACCEPT] on the page before
it can be used. A useful flow is for the enclave to run ENCLU[EACCEPT]
on an uninitialized address. This will trigger the page fault handler
that will add the enclave page and return execution to the enclave to
repeat the ENCLU[EACCEPT] instruction, this time successful.
If the enclave accesses an uninitialized address in another way, for
example by expanding the enclave stack to a page that has not yet been
added, then the page fault handler would add the page on the first
write but upon returning to the enclave the instruction that triggered
the page fault would be repeated and since ENCLU[EACCEPT] was not run
yet it would trigger a second page fault, this time with the SGX flag
set in the page fault error code. This can only be recovered by entering
the enclave again and directly running the ENCLU[EACCEPT] instruction on
the now initialized address.
Accessing an uninitialized address from outside the enclave also
triggers this flow but the page will remain inaccessible (access will
result in #PF) until accepted from within the enclave via
ENCLU[EACCEPT].
Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Haitao Huang <haitao.huang@intel.com>
Tested-by: Vijay Dhanraj <vijay.dhanraj@intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/a254a58eabea053803277449b24b6e4963a3883b.1652137848.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com
In the initial (SGX1) version of SGX, pages in an enclave need to be
created with permissions that support all usages of the pages, from the
time the enclave is initialized until it is unloaded. For example,
pages used by a JIT compiler or when code needs to otherwise be
relocated need to always have RWX permissions.
SGX2 includes a new function ENCLS[EMODPR] that is run from the kernel
and can be used to restrict the EPCM permissions of regular enclave
pages within an initialized enclave.
Introduce ioctl() SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESTRICT_PERMISSIONS to support
restricting EPCM permissions. With this ioctl() the user specifies
a page range and the EPCM permissions to be applied to all pages in
the provided range. ENCLS[EMODPR] is run to restrict the EPCM
permissions followed by the ENCLS[ETRACK] flow that will ensure
no cached linear-to-physical address mappings to the changed
pages remain.
It is possible for the permission change request to fail on any
page within the provided range, either with an error encountered
by the kernel or by the SGX hardware while running
ENCLS[EMODPR]. To support partial success the ioctl() returns an
error code based on failures encountered by the kernel as well
as two result output parameters: one for the number of pages
that were successfully changed and one for the SGX return code.
The page table entry permissions are not impacted by the EPCM
permission changes. VMAs and PTEs will continue to allow the
maximum vetted permissions determined at the time the pages
are added to the enclave. The SGX error code in a page fault
will indicate if it was an EPCM permission check that prevented
an access attempt.
No checking is done to ensure that the permissions are actually
being restricted. This is because the enclave may have relaxed
the EPCM permissions from within the enclave without the kernel
knowing. An attempt to relax permissions using this call will
be ignored by the hardware.
Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Haitao Huang <haitao.huang@intel.com>
Tested-by: Vijay Dhanraj <vijay.dhanraj@intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/082cee986f3c1a2f4fdbf49501d7a8c5a98446f8.1652137848.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com
struct sgx_encl should be protected with the mutex
sgx_encl->lock. One exception is sgx_encl->page_cnt that
is incremented (in sgx_encl_grow()) when an enclave page
is added to the enclave. The reason the mutex is not held
is to allow the reclaimer to be called directly if there are
no EPC pages (in support of a new VA page) available at the time.
Incrementing sgx_encl->page_cnt without sgc_encl->lock held
is currently (before SGX2) safe from concurrent updates because
all paths in which sgx_encl_grow() is called occur before
enclave initialization and are protected with an atomic
operation on SGX_ENCL_IOCTL.
SGX2 includes support for dynamically adding pages after
enclave initialization where the protection of SGX_ENCL_IOCTL
is not available.
Make direct reclaim of EPC pages optional when new VA pages
are added to the enclave. Essentially the existing "reclaim"
flag used when regular EPC pages are added to an enclave
becomes available to the caller when used to allocate VA pages
instead of always being "true".
When adding pages without invoking the reclaimer it is possible
to do so with sgx_encl->lock held, gaining its protection against
concurrent updates to sgx_encl->page_cnt after enclave
initialization.
No functional change.
Reported-by: Haitao Huang <haitao.huang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/42c5934c229982ee67982bb97c6ab34bde758620.1652137848.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com
Move sgx_encl_page_alloc() to encl.c and export it so that it can be
used in the implementation for support of adding pages to initialized
enclaves, which requires to allocate new enclave pages.
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/57ae71b4ea17998467670232e12d6617b95c6811.1652137848.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com
In order to use sgx_encl_{grow,shrink}() in the page augmentation code
located in encl.c, export these functions.
Suggested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/d51730acf54b6565710b2261b3099517b38c2ec4.1652137848.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com
SGX2 functions are not allowed on all page types. For example,
ENCLS[EMODPR] is only allowed on regular SGX enclave pages and
ENCLS[EMODPT] is only allowed on TCS and regular pages. If these
functions are attempted on another type of page the hardware would
trigger a fault.
Keep a record of the SGX page type so that there is more
certainty whether an SGX2 instruction can succeed and faults
can be treated as real failures.
The page type is a property of struct sgx_encl_page
and thus does not cover the VA page type. VA pages are maintained
in separate structures and their type can be determined in
a different way. The SGX2 instructions needing the page type do not
operate on VA pages and this is thus not a scenario needing to
be covered at this time.
struct sgx_encl_page hosting this information is maintained for each
enclave page so the space consumed by the struct is important.
The existing sgx_encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits is already unsigned long
while only using three bits. Transition to a bitfield for the two
members to support the additional information without increasing
the space consumed by the struct.
Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/a0a6939eefe7ba26514f6c49723521cde372de64.1652137848.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com
User provided offset and length is validated when parsing the parameters
of the SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES ioctl(). Extract this validation
(with consistent use of IS_ALIGNED) into a utility that can be used
by the SGX2 ioctl()s that will also provide these values.
Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/767147bc100047abed47fe27c592901adfbb93a2.1652137848.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com
The ETRACK function followed by an IPI to all CPUs within an enclave
is a common pattern with more frequent use in support of SGX2.
Make the (empty) IPI callback function available internally in
preparation for usage by SGX2.
Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1179ed4a9c3c1c2abf49d51bfcf2c30b493181cc.1652137848.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com
The SGX reclaimer removes page table entries pointing to pages that are
moved to swap.
SGX2 enables changes to pages belonging to an initialized enclave, thus
enclave pages may have their permission or type changed while the page
is being accessed by an enclave. Supporting SGX2 requires page table
entries to be removed so that any cached mappings to changed pages
are removed. For example, with the ability to change enclave page types
a regular enclave page may be changed to a Thread Control Structure
(TCS) page that may not be accessed by an enclave.
Factor out the code removing page table entries to a separate function
sgx_zap_enclave_ptes(), fixing accuracy of comments in the process,
and make it available to the upcoming SGX2 code.
Place sgx_zap_enclave_ptes() with the rest of the enclave code in
encl.c interacting with the page table since this code is no longer
unique to the reclaimer.
Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/b010cdf01d7ce55dd0f00e883b7ccbd9db57160a.1652137848.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com
sgx_encl_ewb_cpumask() is no longer unique to the reclaimer where it
is used during the EWB ENCLS leaf function when EPC pages are written
out to main memory and sgx_encl_ewb_cpumask() is used to learn which
CPUs might have executed the enclave to ensure that TLBs are cleared.
Upcoming SGX2 enabling will use sgx_encl_ewb_cpumask() during the
EMODPR and EMODT ENCLS leaf functions that make changes to enclave
pages. The function is needed for the same reason it is used now: to
learn which CPUs might have executed the enclave to ensure that TLBs
no longer point to the changed pages.
Rename sgx_encl_ewb_cpumask() to sgx_encl_cpumask() to reflect the
broader usage.
Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/d4d08c449450a13d8dd3bb6c2b1af03895586d4f.1652137848.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com
Using sgx_encl_ewb_cpumask() to learn which CPUs might have executed
an enclave is useful to ensure that TLBs are cleared when changes are
made to enclave pages.
sgx_encl_ewb_cpumask() is used within the reclaimer when an enclave
page is evicted. The upcoming SGX2 support enables changes to be
made to enclave pages and will require TLBs to not refer to the
changed pages and thus will be needing sgx_encl_ewb_cpumask().
Relocate sgx_encl_ewb_cpumask() to be with the rest of the enclave
code in encl.c now that it is no longer unique to the reclaimer.
Take care to ensure that any future usage maintains the
current context requirement that ETRACK has been called first.
Expand the existing comments to highlight this while moving them
to a more prominent location before the function.
No functional change.
Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/05b60747fd45130cf9fc6edb1c373a69a18a22c5.1652137848.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com
sgx_encl_load_page() is used to find and load an enclave page into
enclave (EPC) memory, potentially loading it from the backing storage.
Both usages of sgx_encl_load_page() are during an access to the
enclave page from a VMA and thus the permissions of the VMA are
considered before the enclave page is loaded.
SGX2 functions operating on enclave pages belonging to an initialized
enclave requiring the page to be in EPC. It is thus required to
support loading enclave pages into the EPC independent from a VMA.
Split the current sgx_encl_load_page() to support the two usages:
A new call, sgx_encl_load_page_in_vma(), behaves exactly like the
current sgx_encl_load_page() that takes VMA permissions into account,
while sgx_encl_load_page() just loads an enclave page into EPC.
VMA, PTE, and EPCM permissions continue to dictate whether
the pages can be accessed from within an enclave.
Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/d4393513c1f18987c14a490bcf133bfb71a5dc43.1652137848.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com
Add a wrapper for the EAUG ENCLS leaf function used to
add a page to an initialized enclave.
EAUG:
1) Stores all properties of the new enclave page in the SGX
hardware's Enclave Page Cache Map (EPCM).
2) Sets the PENDING bit in the EPCM entry of the enclave page.
This bit is cleared by the enclave by invoking ENCLU leaf
function EACCEPT or EACCEPTCOPY.
Access from within the enclave to the new enclave page is not
possible until the PENDING bit is cleared.
Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/97a46754fe4764e908651df63694fb760f783d6e.1652137848.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com
Add a wrapper for the EMODT ENCLS leaf function used to
change the type of an enclave page as maintained in the
SGX hardware's Enclave Page Cache Map (EPCM).
EMODT:
1) Updates the EPCM page type of the enclave page.
2) Sets the MODIFIED bit in the EPCM entry of the enclave page.
This bit is reset by the enclave by invoking ENCLU leaf
function EACCEPT or EACCEPTCOPY.
Access from within the enclave to the enclave page is not possible
while the MODIFIED bit is set.
After changing the enclave page type by issuing EMODT the kernel
needs to collaborate with the hardware to ensure that no logical
processor continues to hold a reference to the changed page. This
is required to ensure no required security checks are circumvented
and is required for the enclave's EACCEPT/EACCEPTCOPY to succeed.
Ensuring that no references to the changed page remain is
accomplished with the ETRACK flow.
Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/dba63a8c0db1d510b940beee1ba2a8207efeb1f1.1652137848.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com
Add a wrapper for the EMODPR ENCLS leaf function used to
restrict enclave page permissions as maintained in the
SGX hardware's Enclave Page Cache Map (EPCM).
EMODPR:
1) Updates the EPCM permissions of an enclave page by treating
the new permissions as a mask. Supplying a value that attempts
to relax EPCM permissions has no effect on EPCM permissions
(PR bit, see below, is changed).
2) Sets the PR bit in the EPCM entry of the enclave page to
indicate that permission restriction is in progress. The bit
is reset by the enclave by invoking ENCLU leaf function
EACCEPT or EACCEPTCOPY.
The enclave may access the page throughout the entire process
if conforming to the EPCM permissions for the enclave page.
After performing the permission restriction by issuing EMODPR
the kernel needs to collaborate with the hardware to ensure that
all logical processors sees the new restricted permissions. This
is required for the enclave's EACCEPT/EACCEPTCOPY to succeed and
is accomplished with the ETRACK flow.
Expand enum sgx_return_code with the possible EMODPR return
values.
Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/d15e7a769e13e4ca671fa2d0a0d3e3aec5aedbd4.1652137848.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com
The SGX ENCLS instruction uses EAX to specify an SGX function and
may require additional registers, depending on the SGX function.
ENCLS invokes the specified privileged SGX function for managing
and debugging enclaves. Macros are used to wrap the ENCLS
functionality and several wrappers are used to wrap the macros to
make the different SGX functions accessible in the code.
The wrappers of the supported SGX functions are cryptic. Add short
descriptions of each as a comment.
Suggested-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/5e78a1126711cbd692d5b8132e0683873398f69e.1652137848.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com
A PCMD (Paging Crypto MetaData) page contains the PCMD
structures of enclave pages that have been encrypted and
moved to the shmem backing store. When all enclave pages
sharing a PCMD page are loaded in the enclave, there is no
need for the PCMD page and it can be truncated from the
backing store.
A few issues appeared around the truncation of PCMD pages. The
known issues have been addressed but the PCMD handling code could
be made more robust by loudly complaining if any new issue appears
in this area.
Add a check that will complain with a warning if the PCMD page is not
actually empty after it has been truncated. There should never be data
in the PCMD page at this point since it is was just checked to be empty
and truncated with enclave mutex held and is updated with the
enclave mutex held.
Suggested-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Haitao Huang <haitao.huang@intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/6495120fed43fafc1496d09dd23df922b9a32709.1652389823.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com
Haitao reported encountering a WARN triggered by the ENCLS[ELDU]
instruction faulting with a #GP.
The WARN is encountered when the reclaimer evicts a range of
pages from the enclave when the same pages are faulted back right away.
Consider two enclave pages (ENCLAVE_A and ENCLAVE_B)
sharing a PCMD page (PCMD_AB). ENCLAVE_A is in the
enclave memory and ENCLAVE_B is in the backing store. PCMD_AB contains
just one entry, that of ENCLAVE_B.
Scenario proceeds where ENCLAVE_A is being evicted from the enclave
while ENCLAVE_B is faulted in.
sgx_reclaim_pages() {
...
/*
* Reclaim ENCLAVE_A
*/
mutex_lock(&encl->lock);
/*
* Get a reference to ENCLAVE_A's
* shmem page where enclave page
* encrypted data will be stored
* as well as a reference to the
* enclave page's PCMD data page,
* PCMD_AB.
* Release mutex before writing
* any data to the shmem pages.
*/
sgx_encl_get_backing(...);
encl_page->desc |= SGX_ENCL_PAGE_BEING_RECLAIMED;
mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
/*
* Fault ENCLAVE_B
*/
sgx_vma_fault() {
mutex_lock(&encl->lock);
/*
* Get reference to
* ENCLAVE_B's shmem page
* as well as PCMD_AB.
*/
sgx_encl_get_backing(...)
/*
* Load page back into
* enclave via ELDU.
*/
/*
* Release reference to
* ENCLAVE_B' shmem page and
* PCMD_AB.
*/
sgx_encl_put_backing(...);
/*
* PCMD_AB is found empty so
* it and ENCLAVE_B's shmem page
* are truncated.
*/
/* Truncate ENCLAVE_B backing page */
sgx_encl_truncate_backing_page();
/* Truncate PCMD_AB */
sgx_encl_truncate_backing_page();
mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
...
}
mutex_lock(&encl->lock);
encl_page->desc &=
~SGX_ENCL_PAGE_BEING_RECLAIMED;
/*
* Write encrypted contents of
* ENCLAVE_A to ENCLAVE_A shmem
* page and its PCMD data to
* PCMD_AB.
*/
sgx_encl_put_backing(...)
/*
* Reference to PCMD_AB is
* dropped and it is truncated.
* ENCLAVE_A's PCMD data is lost.
*/
mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
}
What happens next depends on whether it is ENCLAVE_A being faulted
in or ENCLAVE_B being evicted - but both end up with ENCLS[ELDU] faulting
with a #GP.
If ENCLAVE_A is faulted then at the time sgx_encl_get_backing() is called
a new PCMD page is allocated and providing the empty PCMD data for
ENCLAVE_A would cause ENCLS[ELDU] to #GP
If ENCLAVE_B is evicted first then a new PCMD_AB would be allocated by the
reclaimer but later when ENCLAVE_A is faulted the ENCLS[ELDU] instruction
would #GP during its checks of the PCMD value and the WARN would be
encountered.
Noting that the reclaimer sets SGX_ENCL_PAGE_BEING_RECLAIMED at the time
it obtains a reference to the backing store pages of an enclave page it
is in the process of reclaiming, fix the race by only truncating the PCMD
page after ensuring that no page sharing the PCMD page is in the process
of being reclaimed.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 08999b2489 ("x86/sgx: Free backing memory after faulting the enclave page")
Reported-by: Haitao Huang <haitao.huang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Haitao Huang <haitao.huang@intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/ed20a5db516aa813873268e125680041ae11dfcf.1652389823.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com
Haitao reported encountering a WARN triggered by the ENCLS[ELDU]
instruction faulting with a #GP.
The WARN is encountered when the reclaimer evicts a range of
pages from the enclave when the same pages are faulted back
right away.
The SGX backing storage is accessed on two paths: when there
are insufficient free pages in the EPC the reclaimer works
to move enclave pages to the backing storage and as enclaves
access pages that have been moved to the backing storage
they are retrieved from there as part of page fault handling.
An oversubscribed SGX system will often run the reclaimer and
page fault handler concurrently and needs to ensure that the
backing store is accessed safely between the reclaimer and
the page fault handler. This is not the case because the
reclaimer accesses the backing store without the enclave mutex
while the page fault handler accesses the backing store with
the enclave mutex.
Consider the scenario where a page is faulted while a page sharing
a PCMD page with the faulted page is being reclaimed. The
consequence is a race between the reclaimer and page fault
handler, the reclaimer attempting to access a PCMD at the
same time it is truncated by the page fault handler. This
could result in lost PCMD data. Data may still be
lost if the reclaimer wins the race, this is addressed in
the following patch.
The reclaimer accesses pages from the backing storage without
holding the enclave mutex and runs the risk of concurrently
accessing the backing storage with the page fault handler that
does access the backing storage with the enclave mutex held.
In the scenario below a PCMD page is truncated from the backing
store after all its pages have been loaded in to the enclave
at the same time the PCMD page is loaded from the backing store
when one of its pages are reclaimed:
sgx_reclaim_pages() { sgx_vma_fault() {
...
mutex_lock(&encl->lock);
...
__sgx_encl_eldu() {
...
if (pcmd_page_empty) {
/*
* EPC page being reclaimed /*
* shares a PCMD page with an * PCMD page truncated
* enclave page that is being * while requested from
* faulted in. * reclaimer.
*/ */
sgx_encl_get_backing() <----------> sgx_encl_truncate_backing_page()
}
mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
} }
In this scenario there is a race between the reclaimer and the page fault
handler when the reclaimer attempts to get access to the same PCMD page
that is being truncated. This could result in the reclaimer writing to
the PCMD page that is then truncated, causing the PCMD data to be lost,
or in a new PCMD page being allocated. The lost PCMD data may still occur
after protecting the backing store access with the mutex - this is fixed
in the next patch. By ensuring the backing store is accessed with the mutex
held the enclave page state can be made accurate with the
SGX_ENCL_PAGE_BEING_RECLAIMED flag accurately reflecting that a page
is in the process of being reclaimed.
Consistently protect the reclaimer's backing store access with the
enclave's mutex to ensure that it can safely run concurrently with the
page fault handler.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 1728ab54b4 ("x86/sgx: Add a page reclaimer")
Reported-by: Haitao Huang <haitao.huang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Haitao Huang <haitao.huang@intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/fa2e04c561a8555bfe1f4e7adc37d60efc77387b.1652389823.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com
Recent commit 08999b2489 ("x86/sgx: Free backing memory
after faulting the enclave page") expanded __sgx_encl_eldu()
to clear an enclave page's PCMD (Paging Crypto MetaData)
from the PCMD page in the backing store after the enclave
page is restored to the enclave.
Since the PCMD page in the backing store is modified the page
should be marked as dirty to ensure the modified data is retained.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 08999b2489 ("x86/sgx: Free backing memory after faulting the enclave page")
Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Haitao Huang <haitao.huang@intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/00cd2ac480db01058d112e347b32599c1a806bc4.1652389823.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com
SGX uses shmem backing storage to store encrypted enclave pages
and their crypto metadata when enclave pages are moved out of
enclave memory. Two shmem backing storage pages are associated with
each enclave page - one backing page to contain the encrypted
enclave page data and one backing page (shared by a few
enclave pages) to contain the crypto metadata used by the
processor to verify the enclave page when it is loaded back into
the enclave.
sgx_encl_put_backing() is used to release references to the
backing storage and, optionally, mark both backing store pages
as dirty.
Managing references and dirty status together in this way results
in both backing store pages marked as dirty, even if only one of
the backing store pages are changed.
Additionally, waiting until the page reference is dropped to set
the page dirty risks a race with the page fault handler that
may load outdated data into the enclave when a page is faulted
right after it is reclaimed.
Consider what happens if the reclaimer writes a page to the backing
store and the page is immediately faulted back, before the reclaimer
is able to set the dirty bit of the page:
sgx_reclaim_pages() { sgx_vma_fault() {
...
sgx_encl_get_backing();
... ...
sgx_reclaimer_write() {
mutex_lock(&encl->lock);
/* Write data to backing store */
mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
}
mutex_lock(&encl->lock);
__sgx_encl_eldu() {
...
/*
* Enclave backing store
* page not released
* nor marked dirty -
* contents may not be
* up to date.
*/
sgx_encl_get_backing();
...
/*
* Enclave data restored
* from backing store
* and PCMD pages that
* are not up to date.
* ENCLS[ELDU] faults
* because of MAC or PCMD
* checking failure.
*/
sgx_encl_put_backing();
}
...
/* set page dirty */
sgx_encl_put_backing();
...
mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
} }
Remove the option to sgx_encl_put_backing() to set the backing
pages as dirty and set the needed pages as dirty right after
receiving important data while enclave mutex is held. This ensures that
the page fault handler can get up to date data from a page and prepares
the code for a following change where only one of the backing pages
need to be marked as dirty.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 1728ab54b4 ("x86/sgx: Add a page reclaimer")
Suggested-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Haitao Huang <haitao.huang@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-sgx/8922e48f-6646-c7cc-6393-7c78dcf23d23@intel.com/
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/fa9f98986923f43e72ef4c6702a50b2a0b3c42e3.1652389823.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com
Here is one fix, and 3 documentation updates for 5.18-rc7.
The fix is for the firmware loader which resolves a long-reported
problem where the credentials of the firmware loader could be set to a
userspace process without enough permissions to actually load the
firmware image. Many Android vendors have been reporting this for quite
some time.
The documentation updates are for the embargoed-hardware-issues.rst file
to add a new entry, change an existing one, and sort the list to make
changes easier in the future.
All of these have been in linux-next for a while with no reported
issues.
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
iG0EABECAC0WIQT0tgzFv3jCIUoxPcsxR9QN2y37KQUCYoEMSw8cZ3JlZ0Brcm9h
aC5jb20ACgkQMUfUDdst+ynl8wCgw54h8hggK6eikgctGuyoLJZjDR4AnRVNvtQi
ItQ1+zHzBjkdz1s/DlM7
=/7MV
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Merge tag 'driver-core-5.18-rc7' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/driver-core
Pull driver core fixes from Greg KH:
"Here is one fix, and three documentation updates for 5.18-rc7.
The fix is for the firmware loader which resolves a long-reported
problem where the credentials of the firmware loader could be set to a
userspace process without enough permissions to actually load the
firmware image. Many Android vendors have been reporting this for
quite some time.
The documentation updates are for the embargoed-hardware-issues.rst
file to add a new entry, change an existing one, and sort the list to
make changes easier in the future.
All of these have been in linux-next for a while with no reported
issues"
* tag 'driver-core-5.18-rc7' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/driver-core:
Documentation/process: Update ARM contact for embargoed hardware issues
Documentation/process: Add embargoed HW contact for Ampere Computing
Documentation/process: Make groups alphabetical and use tabs consistently
firmware_loader: use kernel credentials when reading firmware
Here are 2 small driver fixes for 5.18-rc7 that resolve reported
problems:
- slimbus driver irq bugfix
- interconnect sync state bugfix
Both of these have been in linux-next with no reported problems.
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
iG0EABECAC0WIQT0tgzFv3jCIUoxPcsxR9QN2y37KQUCYoELfQ8cZ3JlZ0Brcm9h
aC5jb20ACgkQMUfUDdst+yn1EACeMMP4A10lS7sKlgyM6ftMKA1hu7UAniih+zD/
yGi9Fx4SxUUhYKelF75P
=n7+j
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Merge tag 'char-misc-5.18-rc7' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/char-misc
Pull char/misc driver fixes from Greg KH:
"Here are two small driver fixes for 5.18-rc7 that resolve reported
problems:
- slimbus driver irq bugfix
- interconnect sync state bugfix
Both of these have been in linux-next with no reported problems"
* tag 'char-misc-5.18-rc7' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/char-misc:
slimbus: qcom: Fix IRQ check in qcom_slim_probe
interconnect: Restore sync state by ignoring ipa-virt in provider count
Here are some small tty n_gsm and serial driver fixes for 5.18-rc7 that
resolve reported problems. They include:
- n_gsm fixes for reported issues
- 8250_mtk driver fixes for some platforms
- fsl_lpuart driver fix for reported problem.
- digicolor driver fix for reported problem.
All have been in linux-next for a while with no reported problems.
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
iG0EABECAC0WIQT0tgzFv3jCIUoxPcsxR9QN2y37KQUCYoEM8g8cZ3JlZ0Brcm9h
aC5jb20ACgkQMUfUDdst+ylkRgCePwdlqU8cJAePVKVEQVbBmqV2DQgAoL4aGeH7
/4ZvKAc/3AmUOBU+46sa
=my19
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Merge tag 'tty-5.18-rc7' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/tty
Pull tty/serial driver fixes from Greg KH:
"Here are some small tty n_gsm and serial driver fixes for 5.18-rc7
that resolve reported problems. They include:
- n_gsm fixes for reported issues
- 8250_mtk driver fixes for some platforms
- fsl_lpuart driver fix for reported problem.
- digicolor driver fix for reported problem.
All have been in linux-next for a while with no reported problems"
* tag 'tty-5.18-rc7' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/tty:
fsl_lpuart: Don't enable interrupts too early
tty: n_gsm: fix invalid gsmtty_write_room() result
tty: n_gsm: fix mux activation issues in gsm_config()
tty: n_gsm: fix buffer over-read in gsm_dlci_data()
serial: 8250_mtk: Fix register address for XON/XOFF character
serial: 8250_mtk: Make sure to select the right FEATURE_SEL
serial: 8250_mtk: Fix UART_EFR register address
tty/serial: digicolor: fix possible null-ptr-deref in digicolor_uart_probe()
Here are some small fixes for reported issues with some USB drivers.
They include:
- xhci fixes for xhci-mtk platform driver
- typec driver fixes for reported problems.
- cdc-wdm read-stuck fix
- gadget driver fix for reported race condition
- new usb-serial driver ids
All of these have been in linux-next with no reported problems.
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
iG0EABECAC0WIQT0tgzFv3jCIUoxPcsxR9QN2y37KQUCYoENmA8cZ3JlZ0Brcm9h
aC5jb20ACgkQMUfUDdst+ymxrwCeIzUtnkEw80tyjr3r/ciuZgfqM90AoJ50aiIV
YqYG8aVcUUrM47qQuYUX
=I21N
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Merge tag 'usb-5.18-rc7' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/usb
Pull USB fixes from Greg KH:
"Here are some small fixes for reported issues with some USB drivers.
They include:
- xhci fixes for xhci-mtk platform driver
- typec driver fixes for reported problems.
- cdc-wdm read-stuck fix
- gadget driver fix for reported race condition
- new usb-serial driver ids
All of these have been in linux-next with no reported problems"
* tag 'usb-5.18-rc7' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/usb:
usb: xhci-mtk: remove bandwidth budget table
usb: xhci-mtk: fix fs isoc's transfer error
usb: gadget: fix race when gadget driver register via ioctl
usb: typec: tcpci_mt6360: Update for BMC PHY setting
usb: gadget: uvc: allow for application to cleanly shutdown
usb: typec: tcpci: Don't skip cleanup in .remove() on error
usb: cdc-wdm: fix reading stuck on device close
USB: serial: qcserial: add support for Sierra Wireless EM7590
USB: serial: option: add Fibocom MA510 modem
USB: serial: option: add Fibocom L610 modem
USB: serial: pl2303: add device id for HP LM930 Display
- Fix KVM PR on 32-bit, which was broken by some MMU code refactoring.
Thanks to: Alexander Graf, Matt Evans.
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----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=HVUs
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Merge tag 'powerpc-5.18-5' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/powerpc/linux
Pull powerpc fix from Michael Ellerman:
- Fix KVM PR on 32-bit, which was broken by some MMU code refactoring.
Thanks to: Alexander Graf, and Matt Evans.
* tag 'powerpc-5.18-5' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/powerpc/linux:
KVM: PPC: Book3S PR: Enable MSR_DR for switch_mmu_context()
pasta from the corresponding s390 code screwed up the address calculation
for marking the sub-pmd ranges via memset by omitting the ALIGN_DOWN() to
calculate the proper start address. It's a mystery why this code is not
generic and shared because there is nothing architecture specific in there,
but that's too intrusive for a backportable fix.
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----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=f+jf
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Merge tag 'x86-urgent-2022-05-15' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 fix from Thomas Gleixner:
"A single fix for the handling of unpopulated sub-pmd spaces.
The copy & pasta from the corresponding s390 code screwed up the
address calculation for marking the sub-pmd ranges via memset by
omitting the ALIGN_DOWN() to calculate the proper start address.
It's a mystery why this code is not generic and shared because there
is nothing architecture specific in there, but that's too intrusive
for a backportable fix"
* tag 'x86-urgent-2022-05-15' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/mm: Fix marking of unused sub-pmd ranges
in the middle of the arguments. This reordering broke BPF programs which
relied on the old argument list. While tracepoints are not considered
stable ABI, it's not trivial to make BPF cope with such a change, but it's
being worked on. For now restore the original argument order and move the
new argument to the end of the argument list.
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----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=6Bvx
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Merge tag 'sched-urgent-2022-05-15' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull scheduler fix from Thomas Gleixner:
"The recent expansion of the sched switch tracepoint inserted a new
argument in the middle of the arguments. This reordering broke BPF
programs which relied on the old argument list.
While tracepoints are not considered stable ABI, it's not trivial to
make BPF cope with such a change, but it's being worked on. For now
restore the original argument order and move the new argument to the
end of the argument list"
* tag 'sched-urgent-2022-05-15' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
sched/tracing: Append prev_state to tp args instead
interrupt code. The consolidation of the interrupt handler invocation code
added an unconditional warning when generic_handle_domain_irq() is invoked
from outside hard interrupt context. That's overbroad as the requirement
for invoking these handlers in hard interrupt context is only required for
certain interrupt types. The subsequently called code already contains a
warning which triggers conditionally for interrupt chips which indicate
this requirement in their properties. Remove the overbroad one.
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----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=pJj8
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Merge tag 'irq-urgent-2022-05-15' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull irq fix from Thomas Gleixner:
"A single fix for a recent (introduced in 5.16) regression in the core
interrupt code.
The consolidation of the interrupt handler invocation code added an
unconditional warning when generic_handle_domain_irq() is invoked from
outside hard interrupt context. That's overbroad as the requirement
for invoking these handlers in hard interrupt context is only required
for certain interrupt types. The subsequently called code already
contains a warning which triggers conditionally for interrupt chips
which indicate this requirement in their properties.
Remove the overbroad one"
* tag 'irq-urgent-2022-05-15' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
genirq: Remove WARN_ON_ONCE() in generic_handle_domain_irq()
- Fix two NDEBUG warnings in 'perf bench numa'.
- Fix ARM coresight `perf test` failure.
- Sync linux/kvm.h with the kernel sources.
- Add James and Mike as Arm64 performance events reviewers.
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
iHUEABYKAB0WIQR2GiIUctdOfX2qHhGyPKLppCJ+JwUCYn/zSgAKCRCyPKLppCJ+
J05jAP4gwHLXP1jcyixLRPrJc1tZjJlRSqdOkQn7n1wE4okh4QEA/2k4k+s4Onn6
YMCAJFFgzqi/U77uN5IBX3dLWZ02SAg=
=albT
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Merge tag 'perf-tools-fixes-for-v5.18-2022-05-14' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/acme/linux
Pull perf tools fixes from Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo:
- Fix two NDEBUG warnings in 'perf bench numa'
- Fix ARM coresight `perf test` failure
- Sync linux/kvm.h with the kernel sources
- Add James and Mike as Arm64 performance events reviewers
* tag 'perf-tools-fixes-for-v5.18-2022-05-14' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/acme/linux:
MAINTAINERS: Add James and Mike as Arm64 performance events reviewers
tools headers UAPI: Sync linux/kvm.h with the kernel sources
perf tests: Fix coresight `perf test` failure.
perf bench: Fix two numa NDEBUG warnings
fbdev:
- revert NULL deref fix that turned into a use-after-free
- prevent use-after-free in fbdev
- efifb/simplefb/vesafb: fix cleanup paths to avoid use-after-frees
dma-buf:
- fix panic in stats setup
vc4:
- fix hdmi build
nouveau:
- tegra iommu present fix
- fix leak in backlight name
vmwgfx:
- Black screen due to fences using FIFO checks on SVGA3
- Random black screens on boot due to uninitialized drm_mode_fb_cmd2
- Hangs on SVGA3 due to command buffers being used with gbobjects
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----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=wF/s
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Merge tag 'drm-fixes-2022-05-14' of git://anongit.freedesktop.org/drm/drm
Pull more drm fixes from Dave Airlie:
"Turns out I was right, some fixes hadn't made it to me yet. The vmwgfx
ones also popped up later, but all seem like bad enough things to fix.
The dma-buf, vc4 and nouveau ones are all pretty small.
The fbdev fixes are a bit more complicated: a fix to cleanup fbdev
devices properly, uncovered some use-after-free bugs in existing
drivers. Then the fix for those bugs wasn't correct. This reverts that
fix, and puts the proper fixes in place in the drivers to avoid the
use-after-frees.
This has had a fair number of eyes on it at this stage, and I'm
confident enough that it puts things in the right place, and is less
dangerous than reverting our way out of the initial change at this
stage.
fbdev:
- revert NULL deref fix that turned into a use-after-free
- prevent use-after-free in fbdev
- efifb/simplefb/vesafb: fix cleanup paths to avoid use-after-frees
dma-buf:
- fix panic in stats setup
vc4:
- fix hdmi build
nouveau:
- tegra iommu present fix
- fix leak in backlight name
vmwgfx:
- Black screen due to fences using FIFO checks on SVGA3
- Random black screens on boot due to uninitialized drm_mode_fb_cmd2
- Hangs on SVGA3 due to command buffers being used with gbobjects"
* tag 'drm-fixes-2022-05-14' of git://anongit.freedesktop.org/drm/drm:
drm/vmwgfx: Disable command buffers on svga3 without gbobjects
drm/vmwgfx: Initialize drm_mode_fb_cmd2
drm/vmwgfx: Fix fencing on SVGAv3
drm/vc4: hdmi: Fix build error for implicit function declaration
dma-buf: call dma_buf_stats_setup after dmabuf is in valid list
fbdev: efifb: Fix a use-after-free due early fb_info cleanup
drm/nouveau: Fix a potential theorical leak in nouveau_get_backlight_name()
drm/nouveau/tegra: Stop using iommu_present()
fbdev: vesafb: Cleanup fb_info in .fb_destroy rather than .remove
fbdev: efifb: Cleanup fb_info in .fb_destroy rather than .remove
fbdev: simplefb: Cleanup fb_info in .fb_destroy rather than .remove
fbdev: Prevent possible use-after-free in fb_release()
Revert "fbdev: Make fb_release() return -ENODEV if fbdev was unregistered"
iommu detection improvement for nouveau, a memory leak fix for nouveau,
pointer dereference fix for dma_buf_file_release(), and a build breakage
fix for vc4
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
iHUEABYKAB0WIQRcEzekXsqa64kGDp7j7w1vZxhRxQUCYn4I8QAKCRDj7w1vZxhR
xTQqAQCERNogpvxEuKGk1643nNiPtDLbYcwJMifqa7sQIQk13AD9EKR9oV+JyIZj
2tS06uFF1qWQeXAgS8wGToirZ2E3Fgo=
=a0hl
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Merge tag 'drm-misc-fixes-2022-05-13' of git://anongit.freedesktop.org/drm/drm-misc into drm-fixes
Multiple fixes to fbdev to address a regression at unregistration, an
iommu detection improvement for nouveau, a memory leak fix for nouveau,
pointer dereference fix for dma_buf_file_release(), and a build breakage
fix for vc4
Signed-off-by: Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com>
From: Maxime Ripard <maxime@cerno.tech>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20220513073044.ymayac7x7bzatrt7@houat
- Fix filesystem block deallocation for short writes.
- Stop using glock holder auto-demotion for now.
- Get rid of buffered writes inefficiencies due to page
faults being disabled.
- Minor other cleanups.
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----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=FJq+
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Merge tag 'gfs2-v5.18-rc4-fix3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gfs2/linux-gfs2
Pull gfs2 fixes from Andreas Gruenbacher:
"We've finally identified commit dc732906c2 ("gfs2: Introduce flag
for glock holder auto-demotion") to be the other cause of the
filesystem corruption we've been seeing. This feature isn't strictly
necessary anymore, so we've decided to stop using it for now.
With this and the gfs_iomap_end rounding fix you've already seen
("gfs2: Fix filesystem block deallocation for short writes" in this
pull request), we're corruption free again now.
- Fix filesystem block deallocation for short writes.
- Stop using glock holder auto-demotion for now.
- Get rid of buffered writes inefficiencies due to page faults being
disabled.
- Minor other cleanups"
* tag 'gfs2-v5.18-rc4-fix3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gfs2/linux-gfs2:
gfs2: Stop using glock holder auto-demotion for now
gfs2: buffered write prefaulting
gfs2: Align read and write chunks to the page cache
gfs2: Pull return value test out of should_fault_in_pages
gfs2: Clean up use of fault_in_iov_iter_{read,write}able
gfs2: Variable rename
gfs2: Fix filesystem block deallocation for short writes
We're having unresolved issues with the glock holder auto-demotion mechanism
introduced in commit dc732906c2. This mechanism was assumed to be essential
for avoiding frequent short reads and writes until commit 296abc0d91
("gfs2: No short reads or writes upon glock contention"). Since then,
when the inode glock is lost, it is simply re-acquired and the operation
is resumed. This means that apart from the performance penalty, we
might as well drop the inode glock before faulting in pages, and
re-acquire it afterwards.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
In gfs2_file_buffered_write, to increase the likelihood that all the
user memory we're trying to write will be resident in memory, carry out
the write in chunks and fault in each chunk of user memory before trying
to write it. Otherwise, some workloads will trigger frequent short
"internal" writes, causing filesystem blocks to be allocated and then
partially deallocated again when writing into holes, which is wasteful
and breaks reservations.
Neither the chunked writes nor any of the short "internal" writes are
user visible.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Four fixes, all in drivers. These patches mosly fix error legs and
exceptional conditions (scsi_dh_alua, qla2xxx). The lpfc fixes are
for coding issues with lpfc features.
Signed-off-by: James E.J. Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
iJwEABMIAEQWIQTnYEDbdso9F2cI+arnQslM7pishQUCYn6p/SYcamFtZXMuYm90
dG9tbGV5QGhhbnNlbnBhcnRuZXJzaGlwLmNvbQAKCRDnQslM7pishUK2AQDUTr6B
qqMA9vgYzw7PcqOmWhR8WjStbJwmNsHImFvsigEA1ZG59Pf6UiAo8SFArhFDo7M9
ByFqhdka8gw0Z1fAsJM=
=od7V
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Merge tag 'scsi-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jejb/scsi
Pull SCSI fixes from James Bottomley:
"Four fixes, all in drivers.
These patches mosly fix error legs and exceptional conditions
(scsi_dh_alua, qla2xxx). The lpfc fixes are for coding issues with
lpfc features"
* tag 'scsi-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jejb/scsi:
scsi: lpfc: Correct BDE DMA address assignment for GEN_REQ_WQE
scsi: lpfc: Fix split code for FLOGI on FCoE
scsi: qla2xxx: Fix missed DMA unmap for aborted commands
scsi: scsi_dh_alua: Properly handle the ALUA transitioning state
Align the chunks that reads and writes are carried out in to the page
cache rather than the user buffers. This will be more efficient in
general, especially for allocating writes. Optimizing the case that the
user buffer is gfs2 backed isn't very useful; we only need to make sure
we won't deadlock.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Pull the return value test of the previous read or write operation out
of should_fault_in_pages(). In a following patch, we'll fault in pages
before the I/O and there will be no return value to check.
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Reinette Chatre