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net: tls: Refactor control message handling on recv 

For TLS 1.3, the control message is encrypted.  Handle control
message checks after decryption.

Signed-off-by: Dave Watson <davejwatson@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This commit is contained in:
Dave Watson 2019-01-30 21:58:24 +00:00 committed by David S. Miller
parent a2ef9b6a22
commit fedf201e12
1 changed files with 44 additions and 44 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

88
net/tls/tls_sw.c
View File

@ -1421,16 +1421,15 @@ static int decrypt_skb_update(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
return err;
}
rxm->offset += tls_ctx->rx.prepend_size;
rxm->full_len -= tls_ctx->rx.overhead_size;
tls_advance_record_sn(sk, &tls_ctx->rx);
ctx->decrypted = true;
ctx->saved_data_ready(sk);
} else {
*zc = false;
}
rxm->offset += tls_ctx->rx.prepend_size;
rxm->full_len -= tls_ctx->rx.overhead_size;
tls_advance_record_sn(sk, &tls_ctx->rx);
ctx->decrypted = true;
ctx->saved_data_ready(sk);
return err;
}
@ -1609,6 +1608,25 @@ int tls_sw_recvmsg(struct sock *sk,
rxm = strp_msg(skb);
to_decrypt = rxm->full_len - tls_ctx->rx.overhead_size;
if (to_decrypt <= len && !is_kvec && !is_peek &&
ctx->control == TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA)
zc = true;
err = decrypt_skb_update(sk, skb, &msg->msg_iter,
&chunk, &zc, ctx->async_capable);
if (err < 0 && err != -EINPROGRESS) {
tls_err_abort(sk, EBADMSG);
goto recv_end;
}
if (err == -EINPROGRESS) {
async = true;
num_async++;
goto pick_next_record;
}
if (!cmsg) {
int cerr;
@ -1626,40 +1644,22 @@ int tls_sw_recvmsg(struct sock *sk,
goto recv_end;
}
to_decrypt = rxm->full_len - tls_ctx->rx.overhead_size;
if (!zc) {
if (rxm->full_len > len) {
retain_skb = true;
chunk = len;
} else {
chunk = rxm->full_len;
}
if (to_decrypt <= len && !is_kvec && !is_peek)
zc = true;
err = skb_copy_datagram_msg(skb, rxm->offset,
msg, chunk);
if (err < 0)
goto recv_end;
err = decrypt_skb_update(sk, skb, &msg->msg_iter,
&chunk, &zc, ctx->async_capable);
if (err < 0 && err != -EINPROGRESS) {
tls_err_abort(sk, EBADMSG);
goto recv_end;
}
if (err == -EINPROGRESS) {
async = true;
num_async++;
goto pick_next_record;
} else {
if (!zc) {
if (rxm->full_len > len) {
retain_skb = true;
chunk = len;
} else {
chunk = rxm->full_len;
}
err = skb_copy_datagram_msg(skb, rxm->offset,
msg, chunk);
if (err < 0)
goto recv_end;
if (!is_peek) {
rxm->offset = rxm->offset + chunk;
rxm->full_len = rxm->full_len - chunk;
}
if (!is_peek) {
rxm->offset = rxm->offset + chunk;
rxm->full_len = rxm->full_len - chunk;
}
}
@ -1759,15 +1759,15 @@ ssize_t tls_sw_splice_read(struct socket *sock, loff_t *ppos,
if (!skb)
goto splice_read_end;
/* splice does not support reading control messages */
if (ctx->control != TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA) {
err = -ENOTSUPP;
goto splice_read_end;
}
if (!ctx->decrypted) {
err = decrypt_skb_update(sk, skb, NULL, &chunk, &zc, false);
/* splice does not support reading control messages */
if (ctx->control != TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA) {
err = -ENOTSUPP;
goto splice_read_end;
}
if (err < 0) {
tls_err_abort(sk, EBADMSG);
goto splice_read_end;