bpf: Protect probed address based on kptr_restrict setting
The probed address can be accessed by userspace through querying the task file descriptor (fd). However, it is crucial to adhere to the kptr_restrict setting and refrain from exposing the address if it is not permitted. Signed-off-by: Yafang Shao <laoar.shao@gmail.com> Acked-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230709025630.3735-5-laoar.shao@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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@ -1551,7 +1551,10 @@ int bpf_get_kprobe_info(const struct perf_event *event, u32 *fd_type,
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} else {
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*symbol = NULL;
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*probe_offset = 0;
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*probe_addr = (unsigned long)tk->rp.kp.addr;
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if (kallsyms_show_value(current_cred()))
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*probe_addr = (unsigned long)tk->rp.kp.addr;
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else
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*probe_addr = 0;
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}
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return 0;
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}
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