OrgACRN
/
acrn-kernel
mirror of https://github.com/projectacrn/acrn-kernel.git
1
0
Fork 0
Code Issues Releases Wiki Activity

x86/srso: Add IBPB on VMEXIT 

Upstream commit: d893832d0e

Add the option to flush IBPB only on VMEXIT in order to protect from
malicious guests but one otherwise trusts the software that runs on the
hypervisor.

Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
This commit is contained in:
Borislav Petkov (AMD) 2023-07-07 13:53:41 +02:00 committed by Greg Kroah-Hartman
parent 79c8091888
commit c9ae63d773
4 changed files with 26 additions and 1 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

1
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
View File

@ -310,6 +310,7 @@
#define X86_FEATURE_SRSO (11*32+24) /* "" AMD BTB untrain RETs */
#define X86_FEATURE_SRSO_ALIAS (11*32+25) /* "" AMD BTB untrain RETs through aliasing */
#define X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT (11*32+26) /* "" Issue an IBPB only on VMEXIT */
/* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:1 (EAX), word 12 */
#define X86_FEATURE_AVX_VNNI (12*32+ 4) /* AVX VNNI instructions */

19
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
View File

@ -2316,6 +2316,7 @@ enum srso_mitigation {
SRSO_MITIGATION_MICROCODE,
SRSO_MITIGATION_SAFE_RET,
SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB,
SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT,
};
enum srso_mitigation_cmd {
@ -2323,6 +2324,7 @@ enum srso_mitigation_cmd {
SRSO_CMD_MICROCODE,
SRSO_CMD_SAFE_RET,
SRSO_CMD_IBPB,
SRSO_CMD_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT,
};
static const char * const srso_strings[] = {
@ -2330,6 +2332,7 @@ static const char * const srso_strings[] = {
[SRSO_MITIGATION_MICROCODE] = "Mitigation: microcode",
[SRSO_MITIGATION_SAFE_RET] = "Mitigation: safe RET",
[SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB] = "Mitigation: IBPB",
[SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT] = "Mitigation: IBPB on VMEXIT only"
};
static enum srso_mitigation srso_mitigation __ro_after_init = SRSO_MITIGATION_NONE;
@ -2348,6 +2351,8 @@ static int __init srso_parse_cmdline(char *str)
srso_cmd = SRSO_CMD_SAFE_RET;
else if (!strcmp(str, "ibpb"))
srso_cmd = SRSO_CMD_IBPB;
else if (!strcmp(str, "ibpb-vmexit"))
srso_cmd = SRSO_CMD_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT;
else
pr_err("Ignoring unknown SRSO option (%s).", str);
@ -2431,6 +2436,20 @@ static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void)
pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with CPU_IBPB_ENTRY.\n");
goto pred_cmd;
}
break;
case SRSO_CMD_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT:
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_SRSO)) {
if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB) && has_microcode) {
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT);
srso_mitigation = SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT;
}
} else {
pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with CPU_SRSO.\n");
goto pred_cmd;
}
break;
default:
break;
}

4
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
View File

@ -1485,7 +1485,9 @@ static void svm_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu)
if (sd->current_vmcb != svm->vmcb) {
sd->current_vmcb = svm->vmcb;
indirect_branch_prediction_barrier();
if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT))
indirect_branch_prediction_barrier();
}
if (kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu))
avic_vcpu_load(vcpu, cpu);

3
arch/x86/kvm/svm/vmenter.S
View File

@ -223,6 +223,9 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__svm_vcpu_run)
*/
UNTRAIN_RET
/* SRSO */
ALTERNATIVE "", "call entry_ibpb", X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT
/*
* Clear all general purpose registers except RSP and RAX to prevent
* speculative use of the guest's values, even those that are reloaded