OrgACRN
/
acrn-kernel
mirror of https://github.com/projectacrn/acrn-kernel.git
1
0
Fork 0
Code Issues Releases Wiki Activity

kasan: print the original fault addr when access invalid shadow 

when the checked address is illegal,the corresponding shadow address from
kasan_mem_to_shadow may have no mapping in mmu table.  Access such shadow
address causes kernel oops.  Here is a sample about oops on arm64(VA
39bit) with KASAN_SW_TAGS and KASAN_OUTLINE on:

[ffffffb80aaaaaaa] pgd=000000005d3ce003, p4d=000000005d3ce003,
    pud=000000005d3ce003, pmd=0000000000000000
Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000006 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 3 PID: 100 Comm: sh Not tainted 6.6.0-rc1-dirty #43
Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
pstate: 80000005 (Nzcv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : __hwasan_load8_noabort+0x5c/0x90
lr : do_ib_ob+0xf4/0x110
ffffffb80aaaaaaa is the shadow address for efffff80aaaaaaaa.
The problem is reading invalid shadow in kasan_check_range.

The generic kasan also has similar oops.

It only reports the shadow address which causes oops but not
the original address.

Commit 2f004eea0fc8("x86/kasan: Print original address on #GP")
introduce to kasan_non_canonical_hook but limit it to KASAN_INLINE.

This patch extends it to KASAN_OUTLINE mode.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20231009073748.159228-1-haibo.li@mediatek.com
Fixes: 2f004eea0fc8("x86/kasan: Print original address on #GP")
Signed-off-by: Haibo Li <haibo.li@mediatek.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: AngeloGioacchino Del Regno <angelogioacchino.delregno@collabora.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Haibo Li <haibo.li@mediatek.com>
Cc: Matthias Brugger <matthias.bgg@gmail.com>
Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
This commit is contained in:
Haibo Li 2023-10-09 15:37:48 +08:00 committed by Andrew Morton
parent 2820b0f09b
commit babddbfb7d
2 changed files with 4 additions and 6 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

6
include/linux/kasan.h
View File

@ -466,10 +466,10 @@ static inline void kasan_free_module_shadow(const struct vm_struct *vm) {}
#endif /* (CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC || CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS) && !CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC */ #endif /* (CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC || CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS) && !CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC */
#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE #ifdef CONFIG_KASAN
void kasan_non_canonical_hook(unsigned long addr); void kasan_non_canonical_hook(unsigned long addr);
#else /* CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE */ #else /* CONFIG_KASAN */
static inline void kasan_non_canonical_hook(unsigned long addr) { } static inline void kasan_non_canonical_hook(unsigned long addr) { }
#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE */ #endif /* CONFIG_KASAN */
#endif /* LINUX_KASAN_H */ #endif /* LINUX_KASAN_H */

4
mm/kasan/report.c
View File

@ -621,9 +621,8 @@ void kasan_report_async(void)
} }
#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS */ #endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS */
#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE
/* /*
* With CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE, accesses to bogus pointers (outside the high * With CONFIG_KASAN, accesses to bogus pointers (outside the high
* canonical half of the address space) cause out-of-bounds shadow memory reads * canonical half of the address space) cause out-of-bounds shadow memory reads
* before the actual access. For addresses in the low canonical half of the * before the actual access. For addresses in the low canonical half of the
* address space, as well as most non-canonical addresses, that out-of-bounds * address space, as well as most non-canonical addresses, that out-of-bounds
@ -659,4 +658,3 @@ void kasan_non_canonical_hook(unsigned long addr)
pr_alert("KASAN: %s in range [0x%016lx-0x%016lx]\n", bug_type, pr_alert("KASAN: %s in range [0x%016lx-0x%016lx]\n", bug_type,
orig_addr, orig_addr + KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE - 1); orig_addr, orig_addr + KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE - 1);
} }
#endif