- Get rid of a single ksize() usage
- By popular demand, print the previous microcode revision an update was done over - Remove more code related to the now gone MICROCODE_OLD_INTERFACE - Document the problems stemming from microcode late loading -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIzBAABCgAdFiEEzv7L6UO9uDPlPSfHEsHwGGHeVUoFAmM8QL8ACgkQEsHwGGHe VUoDxw/9FA3rOAZD7N0PI/vspMUxEDQVYV60tfuuynao72HZv+tfJbRTXe42p3ZO B+kRPFud4lAOE1ykDHJ2A2OZzvthGfYlUnMyvk1IvK/gOwkkiSH4c6sVSrOYWtl7 uoIN/3J83BMZoWNOKqrg1OOzotzkTyeucPXdWF+sRkfVzBIgbDqtplbFFCP4abPK WxatY2hkTfBCiN92OSOLaMGg0POpmycy+6roR2Qr5rWrC7nfREVNbKdOyEykZsfV U2gPm0A953sZ3Ye6waFib+qjJdyR7zBQRCJVEGOB6g8BlNwqGv/TY7NIUWSVFT9Y qcAnD3hI0g0UTYdToBUvYEpfD8zC9Wg3tZEpZSBRKh3AR2+Xt44VKQFO4L9uIt6g hWFMBLsFiYnBmKW3arNLQcdamE34GRhwUfXm0OjHTvTWb3aFO1I9+NBCaHp19KVy HD13wGSyj5V9SAVD0ztRFut4ZESejDyYBw9joB2IsjkY2IJmAAsRFgV0KXqUvQLX TX13hnhm894UfQ+4KCXnA0UeEDoXhwAbYFxR89yGeOxoGe1oaPXr9C1/r88YLq0n ekjIVZ3G97PIxmayj3cv9YrRIrrJi4PWF1Raey6go3Ma+rNBRnya5UF6Noch1lHh HeF7t84BZ5Ub6GweWYaMHQZCA+wMCZMYYuCMNzN7b54yRtQuvCc= =lWDD -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'x86_microcode_for_v6.1_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x75 microcode loader updates from Borislav Petkov: - Get rid of a single ksize() usage - By popular demand, print the previous microcode revision an update was done over - Remove more code related to the now gone MICROCODE_OLD_INTERFACE - Document the problems stemming from microcode late loading * tag 'x86_microcode_for_v6.1_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: x86/microcode/AMD: Track patch allocation size explicitly x86/microcode: Print previous version of microcode after reload x86/microcode: Remove ->request_microcode_user() x86/microcode: Document the whole late loading problem
This commit is contained in:
commit
b5f0b11353
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@ -134,6 +134,12 @@ More detailed explanation for tainting
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scsi/snic on something else than x86_64, scsi/ips on non
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x86/x86_64/itanium, have broken firmware settings for the
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irqchip/irq-gic on arm64 ...).
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- x86/x86_64: Microcode late loading is dangerous and will result in
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tainting the kernel. It requires that all CPUs rendezvous to make sure
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the update happens when the system is as quiescent as possible. However,
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a higher priority MCE/SMI/NMI can move control flow away from that
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rendezvous and interrupt the update, which can be detrimental to the
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machine.
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3) ``R`` if a module was force unloaded by ``rmmod -f``, ``' '`` if all
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modules were unloaded normally.
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@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ The Linux Microcode Loader
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:Authors: - Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
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- Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
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- Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@intel.com>
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The kernel has a x86 microcode loading facility which is supposed to
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provide microcode loading methods in the OS. Potential use cases are
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@ -92,15 +93,8 @@ vendor's site.
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Late loading
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============
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There are two legacy user space interfaces to load microcode, either through
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/dev/cpu/microcode or through /sys/devices/system/cpu/microcode/reload file
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in sysfs.
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The /dev/cpu/microcode method is deprecated because it needs a special
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userspace tool for that.
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The easier method is simply installing the microcode packages your distro
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supplies and running::
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You simply install the microcode packages your distro supplies and
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run::
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# echo 1 > /sys/devices/system/cpu/microcode/reload
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@ -110,6 +104,110 @@ The loading mechanism looks for microcode blobs in
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/lib/firmware/{intel-ucode,amd-ucode}. The default distro installation
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packages already put them there.
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Since kernel 5.19, late loading is not enabled by default.
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The /dev/cpu/microcode method has been removed in 5.19.
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Why is late loading dangerous?
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==============================
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Synchronizing all CPUs
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----------------------
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The microcode engine which receives the microcode update is shared
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between the two logical threads in a SMT system. Therefore, when
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the update is executed on one SMT thread of the core, the sibling
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"automatically" gets the update.
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Since the microcode can "simulate" MSRs too, while the microcode update
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is in progress, those simulated MSRs transiently cease to exist. This
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can result in unpredictable results if the SMT sibling thread happens to
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be in the middle of an access to such an MSR. The usual observation is
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that such MSR accesses cause #GPs to be raised to signal that former are
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not present.
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The disappearing MSRs are just one common issue which is being observed.
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Any other instruction that's being patched and gets concurrently
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executed by the other SMT sibling, can also result in similar,
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unpredictable behavior.
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To eliminate this case, a stop_machine()-based CPU synchronization was
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introduced as a way to guarantee that all logical CPUs will not execute
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any code but just wait in a spin loop, polling an atomic variable.
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While this took care of device or external interrupts, IPIs including
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LVT ones, such as CMCI etc, it cannot address other special interrupts
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that can't be shut off. Those are Machine Check (#MC), System Management
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(#SMI) and Non-Maskable interrupts (#NMI).
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Machine Checks
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--------------
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Machine Checks (#MC) are non-maskable. There are two kinds of MCEs.
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Fatal un-recoverable MCEs and recoverable MCEs. While un-recoverable
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errors are fatal, recoverable errors can also happen in kernel context
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are also treated as fatal by the kernel.
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On certain Intel machines, MCEs are also broadcast to all threads in a
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system. If one thread is in the middle of executing WRMSR, a MCE will be
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taken at the end of the flow. Either way, they will wait for the thread
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performing the wrmsr(0x79) to rendezvous in the MCE handler and shutdown
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eventually if any of the threads in the system fail to check in to the
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MCE rendezvous.
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To be paranoid and get predictable behavior, the OS can choose to set
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MCG_STATUS.MCIP. Since MCEs can be at most one in a system, if an
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MCE was signaled, the above condition will promote to a system reset
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automatically. OS can turn off MCIP at the end of the update for that
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core.
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System Management Interrupt
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---------------------------
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SMIs are also broadcast to all CPUs in the platform. Microcode update
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requests exclusive access to the core before writing to MSR 0x79. So if
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it does happen such that, one thread is in WRMSR flow, and the 2nd got
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an SMI, that thread will be stopped in the first instruction in the SMI
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handler.
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Since the secondary thread is stopped in the first instruction in SMI,
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there is very little chance that it would be in the middle of executing
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an instruction being patched. Plus OS has no way to stop SMIs from
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happening.
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Non-Maskable Interrupts
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-----------------------
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When thread0 of a core is doing the microcode update, if thread1 is
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pulled into NMI, that can cause unpredictable behavior due to the
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reasons above.
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OS can choose a variety of methods to avoid running into this situation.
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Is the microcode suitable for late loading?
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-------------------------------------------
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Late loading is done when the system is fully operational and running
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real workloads. Late loading behavior depends on what the base patch on
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the CPU is before upgrading to the new patch.
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This is true for Intel CPUs.
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Consider, for example, a CPU has patch level 1 and the update is to
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patch level 3.
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Between patch1 and patch3, patch2 might have deprecated a software-visible
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feature.
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This is unacceptable if software is even potentially using that feature.
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For instance, say MSR_X is no longer available after an update,
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accessing that MSR will cause a #GP fault.
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Basically there is no way to declare a new microcode update suitable
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for late-loading. This is another one of the problems that caused late
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loading to be not enabled by default.
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Builtin microcode
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=================
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@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
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struct ucode_patch {
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struct list_head plist;
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void *data; /* Intel uses only this one */
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unsigned int size;
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u32 patch_id;
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u16 equiv_cpu;
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};
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};
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struct microcode_ops {
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enum ucode_state (*request_microcode_user) (int cpu,
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const void __user *buf, size_t size);
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enum ucode_state (*request_microcode_fw) (int cpu, struct device *,
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bool refresh_fw);
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@ -788,6 +788,7 @@ static int verify_and_add_patch(u8 family, u8 *fw, unsigned int leftover,
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kfree(patch);
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return -EINVAL;
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}
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patch->size = *patch_size;
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mc_hdr = (struct microcode_header_amd *)(fw + SECTION_HDR_SIZE);
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proc_id = mc_hdr->processor_rev_id;
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return ret;
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memset(amd_ucode_patch, 0, PATCH_MAX_SIZE);
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memcpy(amd_ucode_patch, p->data, min_t(u32, ksize(p->data), PATCH_MAX_SIZE));
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memcpy(amd_ucode_patch, p->data, min_t(u32, p->size, PATCH_MAX_SIZE));
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return ret;
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}
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return ret;
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}
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static enum ucode_state
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request_microcode_user(int cpu, const void __user *buf, size_t size)
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{
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return UCODE_ERROR;
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}
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static void microcode_fini_cpu_amd(int cpu)
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{
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struct ucode_cpu_info *uci = ucode_cpu_info + cpu;
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}
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static struct microcode_ops microcode_amd_ops = {
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.request_microcode_user = request_microcode_user,
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.request_microcode_fw = request_microcode_amd,
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.collect_cpu_info = collect_cpu_info_amd,
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.apply_microcode = apply_microcode_amd,
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@ -491,7 +491,7 @@ static int __reload_late(void *info)
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*/
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static int microcode_reload_late(void)
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{
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int ret;
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int old = boot_cpu_data.microcode, ret;
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pr_err("Attempting late microcode loading - it is dangerous and taints the kernel.\n");
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pr_err("You should switch to early loading, if possible.\n");
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if (ret == 0)
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microcode_check();
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pr_info("Reload completed, microcode revision: 0x%x\n", boot_cpu_data.microcode);
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pr_info("Reload completed, microcode revision: 0x%x -> 0x%x\n",
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old, boot_cpu_data.microcode);
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return ret;
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}
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@ -916,24 +916,7 @@ static enum ucode_state request_microcode_fw(int cpu, struct device *device,
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return ret;
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}
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static enum ucode_state
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request_microcode_user(int cpu, const void __user *buf, size_t size)
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{
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struct iov_iter iter;
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struct iovec iov;
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if (is_blacklisted(cpu))
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return UCODE_NFOUND;
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iov.iov_base = (void __user *)buf;
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iov.iov_len = size;
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iov_iter_init(&iter, WRITE, &iov, 1, size);
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return generic_load_microcode(cpu, &iter);
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}
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static struct microcode_ops microcode_intel_ops = {
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.request_microcode_user = request_microcode_user,
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.request_microcode_fw = request_microcode_fw,
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.collect_cpu_info = collect_cpu_info,
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.apply_microcode = apply_microcode_intel,
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