x86/speculation: Fix RSB filling with CONFIG_RETPOLINE=n

If a kernel is built with CONFIG_RETPOLINE=n, but the user still wants
to mitigate Spectre v2 using IBRS or eIBRS, the RSB filling will be
silently disabled.

There's nothing retpoline-specific about RSB buffer filling.  Remove the
CONFIG_RETPOLINE guards around it.

Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
This commit is contained in:
Josh Poimboeuf 2022-06-14 23:16:05 +02:00 committed by Borislav Petkov
parent d7caac991f
commit b2620facef
3 changed files with 0 additions and 6 deletions

View File

@ -698,7 +698,6 @@ SYM_CODE_START(__switch_to_asm)
movl %ebx, PER_CPU_VAR(__stack_chk_guard)
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
/*
* When switching from a shallower to a deeper call stack
* the RSB may either underflow or use entries populated
@ -707,7 +706,6 @@ SYM_CODE_START(__switch_to_asm)
* speculative execution to prevent attack.
*/
FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %ebx, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW
#endif
/* Restore flags or the incoming task to restore AC state. */
popfl

View File

@ -255,7 +255,6 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__switch_to_asm)
movq %rbx, PER_CPU_VAR(fixed_percpu_data) + stack_canary_offset
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
/*
* When switching from a shallower to a deeper call stack
* the RSB may either underflow or use entries populated
@ -264,7 +263,6 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__switch_to_asm)
* speculative execution to prevent attack.
*/
FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %r12, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW
#endif
/* restore callee-saved registers */
popq %r15

View File

@ -122,11 +122,9 @@
* monstrosity above, manually.
*/
.macro FILL_RETURN_BUFFER reg:req nr:req ftr:req
#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lskip_rsb_\@", "", \ftr
__FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(\reg,\nr,%_ASM_SP)
.Lskip_rsb_\@:
#endif
.endm
/*