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KEYS: asymmetric: Copy sig and digest in public_key_verify_signature() 

commit c3d03e8e35 upstream.

Commit ac4e97abce ("scatterlist: sg_set_buf() argument must be in linear
mapping") checks that both the signature and the digest reside in the
linear mapping area.

However, more recently commit ba14a194a4 ("fork: Add generic vmalloced
stack support") made it possible to move the stack in the vmalloc area,
which is not contiguous, and thus not suitable for sg_set_buf() which needs
adjacent pages.

Always make a copy of the signature and digest in the same buffer used to
store the key and its parameters, and pass them to sg_init_one(). Prefer it
to conditionally doing the copy if necessary, to keep the code simple. The
buffer allocated with kmalloc() is in the linear mapping area.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.9.x
Fixes: ba14a194a4 ("fork: Add generic vmalloced stack support")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/Y4pIpxbjBdajymBJ@sol.localdomain/
Suggested-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Tested-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
This commit is contained in:
Roberto Sassu 2022-12-08 10:56:46 +01:00 committed by Greg Kroah-Hartman
parent 4f303c0b9d
commit 0b28edf227
1 changed files with 21 additions and 17 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

38
crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
View File

@ -380,9 +380,10 @@ int public_key_verify_signature(const struct public_key *pkey,
struct crypto_wait cwait;
struct crypto_akcipher *tfm;
struct akcipher_request *req;
struct scatterlist src_sg[2];
struct scatterlist src_sg;
char alg_name[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME];
char *key, *ptr;
char *buf, *ptr;
size_t buf_len;
int ret;
pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__);
@ -420,34 +421,37 @@ int public_key_verify_signature(const struct public_key *pkey,
if (!req)
goto error_free_tfm;
key = kmalloc(pkey->keylen + sizeof(u32) * 2 + pkey->paramlen,
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!key)
buf_len = max_t(size_t, pkey->keylen + sizeof(u32) * 2 + pkey->paramlen,
sig->s_size + sig->digest_size);
buf = kmalloc(buf_len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!buf)
goto error_free_req;
memcpy(key, pkey->key, pkey->keylen);
ptr = key + pkey->keylen;
memcpy(buf, pkey->key, pkey->keylen);
ptr = buf + pkey->keylen;
ptr = pkey_pack_u32(ptr, pkey->algo);
ptr = pkey_pack_u32(ptr, pkey->paramlen);
memcpy(ptr, pkey->params, pkey->paramlen);
if (pkey->key_is_private)
ret = crypto_akcipher_set_priv_key(tfm, key, pkey->keylen);
ret = crypto_akcipher_set_priv_key(tfm, buf, pkey->keylen);
else
ret = crypto_akcipher_set_pub_key(tfm, key, pkey->keylen);
ret = crypto_akcipher_set_pub_key(tfm, buf, pkey->keylen);
if (ret)
goto error_free_key;
goto error_free_buf;
if (strcmp(pkey->pkey_algo, "sm2") == 0 && sig->data_size) {
ret = cert_sig_digest_update(sig, tfm);
if (ret)
goto error_free_key;
goto error_free_buf;
}
sg_init_table(src_sg, 2);
sg_set_buf(&src_sg[0], sig->s, sig->s_size);
sg_set_buf(&src_sg[1], sig->digest, sig->digest_size);
akcipher_request_set_crypt(req, src_sg, NULL, sig->s_size,
memcpy(buf, sig->s, sig->s_size);
memcpy(buf + sig->s_size, sig->digest, sig->digest_size);
sg_init_one(&src_sg, buf, sig->s_size + sig->digest_size);
akcipher_request_set_crypt(req, &src_sg, NULL, sig->s_size,
sig->digest_size);
crypto_init_wait(&cwait);
akcipher_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG |
@ -455,8 +459,8 @@ int public_key_verify_signature(const struct public_key *pkey,
crypto_req_done, &cwait);
ret = crypto_wait_req(crypto_akcipher_verify(req), &cwait);
error_free_key:
kfree(key);
error_free_buf:
kfree(buf);
error_free_req:
akcipher_request_free(req);
error_free_tfm: