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acrn-kernel/security/lockdown/Kconfig

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security: Add a static lockdown policy LSM While existing LSMs can be extended to handle lockdown policy, distributions generally want to be able to apply a straightforward static policy. This patch adds a simple LSM that can be configured to reject either integrity or all lockdown queries, and can be configured at runtime (through securityfs), boot time (via a kernel parameter) or build time (via a kconfig option). Based on initial code by David Howells. Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2019-08-20 08:17:39 +08:00
config SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM
bool "Basic module for enforcing kernel lockdown"
depends on SECURITY
lockdown: Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down If the kernel is locked down, require that all modules have valid signatures that we can verify. I have adjusted the errors generated: (1) If there's no signature (ENODATA) or we can't check it (ENOPKG, ENOKEY), then: (a) If signatures are enforced then EKEYREJECTED is returned. (b) If there's no signature or we can't check it, but the kernel is locked down then EPERM is returned (this is then consistent with other lockdown cases). (2) If the signature is unparseable (EBADMSG, EINVAL), the signature fails the check (EKEYREJECTED) or a system error occurs (eg. ENOMEM), we return the error we got. Note that the X.509 code doesn't check for key expiry as the RTC might not be valid or might not have been transferred to the kernel's clock yet. [Modified by Matthew Garrett to remove the IMA integration. This will be replaced with integration with the IMA architecture policy patchset.] Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <matthewgarrett@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2019-08-20 08:17:40 +08:00
select MODULE_SIG if MODULES
security: Add a static lockdown policy LSM While existing LSMs can be extended to handle lockdown policy, distributions generally want to be able to apply a straightforward static policy. This patch adds a simple LSM that can be configured to reject either integrity or all lockdown queries, and can be configured at runtime (through securityfs), boot time (via a kernel parameter) or build time (via a kconfig option). Based on initial code by David Howells. Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2019-08-20 08:17:39 +08:00
help
Build support for an LSM that enforces a coarse kernel lockdown
behaviour.
config SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM_EARLY
bool "Enable lockdown LSM early in init"
depends on SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM
help
Enable the lockdown LSM early in boot. This is necessary in order
to ensure that lockdown enforcement can be carried out on kernel
boot parameters that are otherwise parsed before the security
subsystem is fully initialised. If enabled, lockdown will
unconditionally be called before any other LSMs.
choice
prompt "Kernel default lockdown mode"
default LOCK_DOWN_KERNEL_FORCE_NONE
depends on SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM
help
The kernel can be configured to default to differing levels of
lockdown.
config LOCK_DOWN_KERNEL_FORCE_NONE
bool "None"
help
No lockdown functionality is enabled by default. Lockdown may be
enabled via the kernel commandline or /sys/kernel/security/lockdown.
config LOCK_DOWN_KERNEL_FORCE_INTEGRITY
bool "Integrity"
help
The kernel runs in integrity mode by default. Features that allow
the kernel to be modified at runtime are disabled.
config LOCK_DOWN_KERNEL_FORCE_CONFIDENTIALITY
bool "Confidentiality"
help
The kernel runs in confidentiality mode by default. Features that
allow the kernel to be modified at runtime or that permit userland
code to read confidential material held inside the kernel are
disabled.
endchoice