2018-12-28 16:31:14 +08:00
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// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
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2018-12-28 16:29:45 +08:00
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/*
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2020-12-23 04:00:32 +08:00
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* This file contains common KASAN code.
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2018-12-28 16:29:45 +08:00
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*
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* Copyright (c) 2014 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.
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* Author: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
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*
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* Some code borrowed from https://github.com/xairy/kasan-prototype by
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* Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
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*/
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#include <linux/export.h>
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#include <linux/init.h>
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#include <linux/kasan.h>
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#include <linux/kernel.h>
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#include <linux/linkage.h>
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#include <linux/memblock.h>
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#include <linux/memory.h>
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#include <linux/mm.h>
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#include <linux/module.h>
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#include <linux/printk.h>
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#include <linux/sched.h>
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#include <linux/sched/task_stack.h>
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#include <linux/slab.h>
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#include <linux/stacktrace.h>
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#include <linux/string.h>
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#include <linux/types.h>
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#include <linux/bug.h>
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#include "kasan.h"
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#include "../slab.h"
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2022-09-06 05:05:38 +08:00
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struct slab *kasan_addr_to_slab(const void *addr)
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{
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if (virt_addr_valid(addr))
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return virt_to_slab(addr);
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return NULL;
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}
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2021-11-06 04:35:43 +08:00
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depot_stack_handle_t kasan_save_stack(gfp_t flags, bool can_alloc)
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2018-12-28 16:29:45 +08:00
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{
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unsigned long entries[KASAN_STACK_DEPTH];
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2019-04-25 17:45:02 +08:00
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unsigned int nr_entries;
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2018-12-28 16:29:45 +08:00
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2019-04-25 17:45:02 +08:00
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nr_entries = stack_trace_save(entries, ARRAY_SIZE(entries), 0);
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2022-09-15 23:03:36 +08:00
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return __stack_depot_save(entries, nr_entries, 0, flags, can_alloc);
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2018-12-28 16:29:45 +08:00
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}
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2020-08-07 14:24:39 +08:00
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void kasan_set_track(struct kasan_track *track, gfp_t flags)
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2018-12-28 16:29:45 +08:00
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{
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track->pid = current->pid;
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2021-11-06 04:35:43 +08:00
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track->stack = kasan_save_stack(flags, true);
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2018-12-28 16:29:45 +08:00
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}
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2020-12-23 04:00:56 +08:00
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#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) || defined(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS)
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2018-12-28 16:29:45 +08:00
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void kasan_enable_current(void)
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{
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current->kasan_depth++;
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}
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2021-06-29 10:34:33 +08:00
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(kasan_enable_current);
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2018-12-28 16:29:45 +08:00
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void kasan_disable_current(void)
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{
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current->kasan_depth--;
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}
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2021-06-29 10:34:33 +08:00
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(kasan_disable_current);
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2020-12-23 04:00:56 +08:00
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#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC || CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS */
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2018-12-28 16:29:45 +08:00
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2020-12-23 04:03:10 +08:00
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void __kasan_unpoison_range(const void *address, size_t size)
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2020-12-23 04:00:21 +08:00
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{
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2021-04-30 13:59:59 +08:00
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kasan_unpoison(address, size, false);
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2020-12-23 04:00:21 +08:00
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}
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2021-04-17 06:46:00 +08:00
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#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_STACK
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2018-12-28 16:29:45 +08:00
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/* Unpoison the entire stack for a task. */
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void kasan_unpoison_task_stack(struct task_struct *task)
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{
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2020-12-23 04:02:49 +08:00
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void *base = task_stack_page(task);
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2021-04-30 13:59:59 +08:00
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kasan_unpoison(base, THREAD_SIZE, false);
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2018-12-28 16:29:45 +08:00
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}
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/* Unpoison the stack for the current task beyond a watermark sp value. */
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asmlinkage void kasan_unpoison_task_stack_below(const void *watermark)
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{
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/*
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* Calculate the task stack base address. Avoid using 'current'
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* because this function is called by early resume code which hasn't
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* yet set up the percpu register (%gs).
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*/
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void *base = (void *)((unsigned long)watermark & ~(THREAD_SIZE - 1));
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2021-04-30 13:59:59 +08:00
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kasan_unpoison(base, watermark - base, false);
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2018-12-28 16:29:45 +08:00
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}
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2020-12-23 04:02:42 +08:00
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#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_STACK */
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2018-12-28 16:29:45 +08:00
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2021-06-03 07:52:28 +08:00
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void __kasan_unpoison_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order, bool init)
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2018-12-28 16:29:45 +08:00
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{
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2018-12-28 16:30:57 +08:00
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u8 tag;
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unsigned long i;
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2018-12-28 16:30:50 +08:00
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if (unlikely(PageHighMem(page)))
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return;
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2018-12-28 16:30:57 +08:00
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2021-02-25 04:05:05 +08:00
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tag = kasan_random_tag();
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2022-06-10 23:21:38 +08:00
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kasan_unpoison(set_tag(page_address(page), tag),
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PAGE_SIZE << order, init);
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2018-12-28 16:30:57 +08:00
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for (i = 0; i < (1 << order); i++)
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page_kasan_tag_set(page + i, tag);
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2018-12-28 16:29:45 +08:00
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}
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2021-06-03 07:52:28 +08:00
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void __kasan_poison_pages(struct page *page, unsigned int order, bool init)
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2018-12-28 16:29:45 +08:00
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{
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if (likely(!PageHighMem(page)))
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2021-02-25 04:05:05 +08:00
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kasan_poison(page_address(page), PAGE_SIZE << order,
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2022-05-13 11:23:08 +08:00
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KASAN_PAGE_FREE, init);
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2018-12-28 16:29:45 +08:00
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}
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2021-02-26 09:19:55 +08:00
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void __kasan_cache_create_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *cache)
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{
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cache->kasan_info.is_kmalloc = true;
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}
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2021-10-04 21:46:46 +08:00
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void __kasan_poison_slab(struct slab *slab)
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2018-12-28 16:29:45 +08:00
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{
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2021-10-04 21:46:46 +08:00
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struct page *page = slab_page(slab);
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2018-12-28 16:30:57 +08:00
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unsigned long i;
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2019-09-24 06:34:30 +08:00
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for (i = 0; i < compound_nr(page); i++)
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2018-12-28 16:30:57 +08:00
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page_kasan_tag_reset(page + i);
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2021-02-25 04:05:05 +08:00
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kasan_poison(page_address(page), page_size(page),
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2022-05-13 11:23:08 +08:00
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KASAN_SLAB_REDZONE, false);
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2018-12-28 16:29:45 +08:00
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}
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2020-12-23 04:03:10 +08:00
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void __kasan_unpoison_object_data(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object)
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2018-12-28 16:29:45 +08:00
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{
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2021-04-30 13:59:59 +08:00
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kasan_unpoison(object, cache->object_size, false);
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2018-12-28 16:29:45 +08:00
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}
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2020-12-23 04:03:10 +08:00
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void __kasan_poison_object_data(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object)
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2018-12-28 16:29:45 +08:00
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{
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2021-02-26 09:20:27 +08:00
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kasan_poison(object, round_up(cache->object_size, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE),
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2022-05-13 11:23:08 +08:00
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KASAN_SLAB_REDZONE, false);
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2018-12-28 16:29:45 +08:00
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}
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2018-12-28 16:30:50 +08:00
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/*
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2019-01-09 07:23:18 +08:00
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* This function assigns a tag to an object considering the following:
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* 1. A cache might have a constructor, which might save a pointer to a slab
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* object somewhere (e.g. in the object itself). We preassign a tag for
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* each object in caches with constructors during slab creation and reuse
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* the same tag each time a particular object is allocated.
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* 2. A cache might be SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU, which means objects can be
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* accessed after being freed. We preassign tags for objects in these
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* caches as well.
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* 3. For SLAB allocator we can't preassign tags randomly since the freelist
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* is stored as an array of indexes instead of a linked list. Assign tags
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* based on objects indexes, so that objects that are next to each other
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* get different tags.
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2018-12-28 16:30:50 +08:00
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*/
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2021-02-26 09:20:35 +08:00
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static inline u8 assign_tag(struct kmem_cache *cache,
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const void *object, bool init)
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2018-12-28 16:30:50 +08:00
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{
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2020-12-23 04:03:20 +08:00
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if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC))
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return 0xff;
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2019-01-09 07:23:18 +08:00
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/*
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* If the cache neither has a constructor nor has SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU
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* set, assign a tag when the object is being allocated (init == false).
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*/
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2018-12-28 16:30:50 +08:00
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if (!cache->ctor && !(cache->flags & SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU))
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2021-02-25 04:05:05 +08:00
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return init ? KASAN_TAG_KERNEL : kasan_random_tag();
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2018-12-28 16:30:50 +08:00
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2019-01-09 07:23:18 +08:00
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/* For caches that either have a constructor or SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU: */
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2018-12-28 16:30:50 +08:00
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#ifdef CONFIG_SLAB
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2019-01-09 07:23:18 +08:00
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/* For SLAB assign tags based on the object index in the freelist. */
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2021-11-02 22:42:04 +08:00
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return (u8)obj_to_index(cache, virt_to_slab(object), (void *)object);
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2018-12-28 16:30:50 +08:00
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#else
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2019-01-09 07:23:18 +08:00
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/*
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* For SLUB assign a random tag during slab creation, otherwise reuse
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* the already assigned tag.
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*/
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2021-02-25 04:05:05 +08:00
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return init ? kasan_random_tag() : get_tag(object);
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2018-12-28 16:30:50 +08:00
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#endif
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}
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2020-12-23 04:03:10 +08:00
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void * __must_check __kasan_init_slab_obj(struct kmem_cache *cache,
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2018-12-28 16:31:01 +08:00
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const void *object)
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2018-12-28 16:29:45 +08:00
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{
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2022-09-06 05:05:23 +08:00
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/* Initialize per-object metadata if it is present. */
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2022-09-06 05:05:26 +08:00
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if (kasan_requires_meta())
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2022-09-06 05:05:23 +08:00
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kasan_init_object_meta(cache, object);
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2018-12-28 16:29:45 +08:00
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2020-12-23 04:03:20 +08:00
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/* Tag is ignored in set_tag() without CONFIG_KASAN_SW/HW_TAGS */
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kasan, mm: optimize kmalloc poisoning
For allocations from kmalloc caches, kasan_kmalloc() always follows
kasan_slab_alloc(). Currenly, both of them unpoison the whole object,
which is unnecessary.
This patch provides separate implementations for both annotations:
kasan_slab_alloc() unpoisons the whole object, and kasan_kmalloc() only
poisons the redzone.
For generic KASAN, the redzone start might not be aligned to
KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE. Therefore, the poisoning is split in two parts:
kasan_poison_last_granule() poisons the unaligned part, and then
kasan_poison() poisons the rest.
This patch also clarifies alignment guarantees of each of the poisoning
functions and drops the unnecessary round_up() call for redzone_end.
With this change, the early SLUB cache annotation needs to be changed to
kasan_slab_alloc(), as kasan_kmalloc() doesn't unpoison objects now. The
number of poisoned bytes for objects in this cache stays the same, as
kmem_cache_node->object_size is equal to sizeof(struct kmem_cache_node).
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/7e3961cb52be380bc412860332063f5f7ce10d13.1612546384.git.andreyknvl@google.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com>
Cc: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>
Cc: Peter Collingbourne <pcc@google.com>
Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-02-26 09:19:59 +08:00
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object = set_tag(object, assign_tag(cache, object, true));
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2018-12-28 16:30:50 +08:00
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2018-12-28 16:29:45 +08:00
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return (void *)object;
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}
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2021-04-30 14:00:09 +08:00
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static inline bool ____kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object,
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unsigned long ip, bool quarantine, bool init)
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2018-12-28 16:29:45 +08:00
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{
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2018-12-28 16:30:50 +08:00
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void *tagged_object;
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2018-12-28 16:29:45 +08:00
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2021-06-29 10:40:42 +08:00
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if (!kasan_arch_is_ready())
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return false;
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2018-12-28 16:30:50 +08:00
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tagged_object = object;
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2020-12-23 04:02:52 +08:00
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object = kasan_reset_tag(object);
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2018-12-28 16:30:50 +08:00
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2021-02-26 09:19:21 +08:00
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if (is_kfence_address(object))
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return false;
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2021-11-02 22:42:04 +08:00
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if (unlikely(nearest_obj(cache, virt_to_slab(object), object) !=
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2018-12-28 16:29:45 +08:00
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object)) {
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2022-06-15 14:22:18 +08:00
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kasan_report_invalid_free(tagged_object, ip, KASAN_REPORT_INVALID_FREE);
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2018-12-28 16:29:45 +08:00
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return true;
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}
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/* RCU slabs could be legally used after free within the RCU period */
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if (unlikely(cache->flags & SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU))
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return false;
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2021-02-25 04:05:50 +08:00
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if (!kasan_byte_accessible(tagged_object)) {
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2022-06-15 14:22:18 +08:00
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kasan_report_invalid_free(tagged_object, ip, KASAN_REPORT_DOUBLE_FREE);
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2018-12-28 16:29:45 +08:00
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return true;
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}
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2021-02-26 09:20:27 +08:00
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kasan_poison(object, round_up(cache->object_size, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE),
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2022-05-13 11:23:08 +08:00
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KASAN_SLAB_FREE, init);
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2018-12-28 16:29:45 +08:00
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2020-12-23 04:03:28 +08:00
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if ((IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) && !quarantine))
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2018-12-28 16:29:45 +08:00
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return false;
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2021-02-26 09:20:07 +08:00
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if (kasan_stack_collection_enabled())
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2022-09-06 05:05:34 +08:00
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kasan_save_free_info(cache, tagged_object);
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2019-09-24 06:34:13 +08:00
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2021-02-25 04:05:05 +08:00
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return kasan_quarantine_put(cache, object);
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2018-12-28 16:29:45 +08:00
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}
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2021-04-30 14:00:09 +08:00
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bool __kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object,
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unsigned long ip, bool init)
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2018-12-28 16:29:45 +08:00
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{
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2021-04-30 14:00:09 +08:00
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|
|
return ____kasan_slab_free(cache, object, ip, true, init);
|
2018-12-28 16:29:45 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2021-02-26 09:20:35 +08:00
|
|
|
static inline bool ____kasan_kfree_large(void *ptr, unsigned long ip)
|
2021-02-26 09:20:11 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
kasan: fix Oops due to missing calls to kasan_arch_is_ready()
commit 55d77bae73426237b3c74c1757a894b056550dff upstream.
On powerpc64, you can build a kernel with KASAN as soon as you build it
with RADIX MMU support. However if the CPU doesn't have RADIX MMU, KASAN
isn't enabled at init and the following Oops is encountered.
[ 0.000000][ T0] KASAN not enabled as it requires radix!
[ 4.484295][ T26] BUG: Unable to handle kernel data access at 0xc00e000000804a04
[ 4.485270][ T26] Faulting instruction address: 0xc00000000062ec6c
[ 4.485748][ T26] Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1]
[ 4.485920][ T26] BE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Hash SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA pSeries
[ 4.486259][ T26] Modules linked in:
[ 4.486637][ T26] CPU: 0 PID: 26 Comm: kworker/u2:2 Not tainted 6.2.0-rc3-02590-gf8a023b0a805 #249
[ 4.486907][ T26] Hardware name: IBM pSeries (emulated by qemu) POWER9 (raw) 0x4e1200 0xf000005 of:SLOF,HEAD pSeries
[ 4.487445][ T26] Workqueue: eval_map_wq .tracer_init_tracefs_work_func
[ 4.488744][ T26] NIP: c00000000062ec6c LR: c00000000062bb84 CTR: c0000000002ebcd0
[ 4.488867][ T26] REGS: c0000000049175c0 TRAP: 0380 Not tainted (6.2.0-rc3-02590-gf8a023b0a805)
[ 4.489028][ T26] MSR: 8000000002009032 <SF,VEC,EE,ME,IR,DR,RI> CR: 44002808 XER: 00000000
[ 4.489584][ T26] CFAR: c00000000062bb80 IRQMASK: 0
[ 4.489584][ T26] GPR00: c0000000005624d4 c000000004917860 c000000001cfc000 1800000000804a04
[ 4.489584][ T26] GPR04: c0000000003a2650 0000000000000cc0 c00000000000d3d8 c00000000000d3d8
[ 4.489584][ T26] GPR08: c0000000049175b0 a80e000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000017d78400
[ 4.489584][ T26] GPR12: 0000000044002204 c000000003790000 c00000000435003c c0000000043f1c40
[ 4.489584][ T26] GPR16: c0000000043f1c68 c0000000043501a0 c000000002106138 c0000000043f1c08
[ 4.489584][ T26] GPR20: c0000000043f1c10 c0000000043f1c20 c000000004146c40 c000000002fdb7f8
[ 4.489584][ T26] GPR24: c000000002fdb834 c000000003685e00 c000000004025030 c000000003522e90
[ 4.489584][ T26] GPR28: 0000000000000cc0 c0000000003a2650 c000000004025020 c000000004025020
[ 4.491201][ T26] NIP [c00000000062ec6c] .kasan_byte_accessible+0xc/0x20
[ 4.491430][ T26] LR [c00000000062bb84] .__kasan_check_byte+0x24/0x90
[ 4.491767][ T26] Call Trace:
[ 4.491941][ T26] [c000000004917860] [c00000000062ae70] .__kasan_kmalloc+0xc0/0x110 (unreliable)
[ 4.492270][ T26] [c0000000049178f0] [c0000000005624d4] .krealloc+0x54/0x1c0
[ 4.492453][ T26] [c000000004917990] [c0000000003a2650] .create_trace_option_files+0x280/0x530
[ 4.492613][ T26] [c000000004917a90] [c000000002050d90] .tracer_init_tracefs_work_func+0x274/0x2c0
[ 4.492771][ T26] [c000000004917b40] [c0000000001f9948] .process_one_work+0x578/0x9f0
[ 4.492927][ T26] [c000000004917c30] [c0000000001f9ebc] .worker_thread+0xfc/0x950
[ 4.493084][ T26] [c000000004917d60] [c00000000020be84] .kthread+0x1a4/0x1b0
[ 4.493232][ T26] [c000000004917e10] [c00000000000d3d8] .ret_from_kernel_thread+0x58/0x60
[ 4.495642][ T26] Code: 60000000 7cc802a6 38a00000 4bfffc78 60000000 7cc802a6 38a00001 4bfffc68 60000000 3d20a80e 7863e8c2 792907c6 <7c6348ae> 20630007 78630fe0 68630001
[ 4.496704][ T26] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
The Oops is due to kasan_byte_accessible() not checking the readiness of
KASAN. Add missing call to kasan_arch_is_ready() and bail out when not
ready. The same problem is observed with ____kasan_kfree_large() so fix
it the same.
Also, as KASAN is not available and no shadow area is allocated for linear
memory mapping, there is no point in allocating shadow mem for vmalloc
memory as shown below in /sys/kernel/debug/kernel_page_tables
---[ kasan shadow mem start ]---
0xc00f000000000000-0xc00f00000006ffff 0x00000000040f0000 448K r w pte valid present dirty accessed
0xc00f000000860000-0xc00f00000086ffff 0x000000000ac10000 64K r w pte valid present dirty accessed
0xc00f3ffffffe0000-0xc00f3fffffffffff 0x0000000004d10000 128K r w pte valid present dirty accessed
---[ kasan shadow mem end ]---
So, also verify KASAN readiness before allocating and poisoning
shadow mem for VMAs.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/150768c55722311699fdcf8f5379e8256749f47d.1674716617.git.christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu
Fixes: 41b7a347bf14 ("powerpc: Book3S 64-bit outline-only KASAN support")
Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Reported-by: Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com>
Suggested-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [5.19+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2023-01-26 15:04:47 +08:00
|
|
|
if (!kasan_arch_is_ready())
|
|
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
|
2021-02-26 09:20:11 +08:00
|
|
|
if (ptr != page_address(virt_to_head_page(ptr))) {
|
2022-06-15 14:22:18 +08:00
|
|
|
kasan_report_invalid_free(ptr, ip, KASAN_REPORT_INVALID_FREE);
|
2021-02-26 09:20:11 +08:00
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!kasan_byte_accessible(ptr)) {
|
2022-06-15 14:22:18 +08:00
|
|
|
kasan_report_invalid_free(ptr, ip, KASAN_REPORT_DOUBLE_FREE);
|
2021-02-26 09:20:11 +08:00
|
|
|
return true;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
2022-03-25 09:10:10 +08:00
|
|
|
* The object will be poisoned by kasan_poison_pages() or
|
2021-02-26 09:20:11 +08:00
|
|
|
* kasan_slab_free_mempool().
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
void __kasan_kfree_large(void *ptr, unsigned long ip)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
____kasan_kfree_large(ptr, ip);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-12-23 04:03:13 +08:00
|
|
|
void __kasan_slab_free_mempool(void *ptr, unsigned long ip)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2021-10-04 21:46:46 +08:00
|
|
|
struct folio *folio;
|
2020-12-23 04:03:13 +08:00
|
|
|
|
2021-10-04 21:46:46 +08:00
|
|
|
folio = virt_to_folio(ptr);
|
2020-12-23 04:03:13 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Even though this function is only called for kmem_cache_alloc and
|
|
|
|
* kmalloc backed mempool allocations, those allocations can still be
|
|
|
|
* !PageSlab() when the size provided to kmalloc is larger than
|
|
|
|
* KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE, and kmalloc falls back onto page_alloc.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2021-10-04 21:46:46 +08:00
|
|
|
if (unlikely(!folio_test_slab(folio))) {
|
2021-02-26 09:20:11 +08:00
|
|
|
if (____kasan_kfree_large(ptr, ip))
|
2020-12-23 04:03:13 +08:00
|
|
|
return;
|
2022-05-13 11:23:08 +08:00
|
|
|
kasan_poison(ptr, folio_size(folio), KASAN_PAGE_FREE, false);
|
2020-12-23 04:03:13 +08:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
2021-10-04 21:46:46 +08:00
|
|
|
struct slab *slab = folio_slab(folio);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
____kasan_slab_free(slab->slab_cache, ptr, ip, false, false);
|
2020-12-23 04:03:13 +08:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
kasan, mm: optimize kmalloc poisoning
For allocations from kmalloc caches, kasan_kmalloc() always follows
kasan_slab_alloc(). Currenly, both of them unpoison the whole object,
which is unnecessary.
This patch provides separate implementations for both annotations:
kasan_slab_alloc() unpoisons the whole object, and kasan_kmalloc() only
poisons the redzone.
For generic KASAN, the redzone start might not be aligned to
KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE. Therefore, the poisoning is split in two parts:
kasan_poison_last_granule() poisons the unaligned part, and then
kasan_poison() poisons the rest.
This patch also clarifies alignment guarantees of each of the poisoning
functions and drops the unnecessary round_up() call for redzone_end.
With this change, the early SLUB cache annotation needs to be changed to
kasan_slab_alloc(), as kasan_kmalloc() doesn't unpoison objects now. The
number of poisoned bytes for objects in this cache stays the same, as
kmem_cache_node->object_size is equal to sizeof(struct kmem_cache_node).
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/7e3961cb52be380bc412860332063f5f7ce10d13.1612546384.git.andreyknvl@google.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com>
Cc: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>
Cc: Peter Collingbourne <pcc@google.com>
Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-02-26 09:19:59 +08:00
|
|
|
void * __must_check __kasan_slab_alloc(struct kmem_cache *cache,
|
2021-04-30 14:00:06 +08:00
|
|
|
void *object, gfp_t flags, bool init)
|
kasan, mm: optimize kmalloc poisoning
For allocations from kmalloc caches, kasan_kmalloc() always follows
kasan_slab_alloc(). Currenly, both of them unpoison the whole object,
which is unnecessary.
This patch provides separate implementations for both annotations:
kasan_slab_alloc() unpoisons the whole object, and kasan_kmalloc() only
poisons the redzone.
For generic KASAN, the redzone start might not be aligned to
KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE. Therefore, the poisoning is split in two parts:
kasan_poison_last_granule() poisons the unaligned part, and then
kasan_poison() poisons the rest.
This patch also clarifies alignment guarantees of each of the poisoning
functions and drops the unnecessary round_up() call for redzone_end.
With this change, the early SLUB cache annotation needs to be changed to
kasan_slab_alloc(), as kasan_kmalloc() doesn't unpoison objects now. The
number of poisoned bytes for objects in this cache stays the same, as
kmem_cache_node->object_size is equal to sizeof(struct kmem_cache_node).
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/7e3961cb52be380bc412860332063f5f7ce10d13.1612546384.git.andreyknvl@google.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com>
Cc: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>
Cc: Peter Collingbourne <pcc@google.com>
Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-02-26 09:19:59 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
u8 tag;
|
|
|
|
void *tagged_object;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (gfpflags_allow_blocking(flags))
|
|
|
|
kasan_quarantine_reduce();
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (unlikely(object == NULL))
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (is_kfence_address(object))
|
|
|
|
return (void *)object;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Generate and assign random tag for tag-based modes.
|
|
|
|
* Tag is ignored in set_tag() for the generic mode.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
tag = assign_tag(cache, object, false);
|
|
|
|
tagged_object = set_tag(object, tag);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Unpoison the whole object.
|
|
|
|
* For kmalloc() allocations, kasan_kmalloc() will do precise poisoning.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2021-04-30 14:00:06 +08:00
|
|
|
kasan_unpoison(tagged_object, cache->object_size, init);
|
kasan, mm: optimize kmalloc poisoning
For allocations from kmalloc caches, kasan_kmalloc() always follows
kasan_slab_alloc(). Currenly, both of them unpoison the whole object,
which is unnecessary.
This patch provides separate implementations for both annotations:
kasan_slab_alloc() unpoisons the whole object, and kasan_kmalloc() only
poisons the redzone.
For generic KASAN, the redzone start might not be aligned to
KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE. Therefore, the poisoning is split in two parts:
kasan_poison_last_granule() poisons the unaligned part, and then
kasan_poison() poisons the rest.
This patch also clarifies alignment guarantees of each of the poisoning
functions and drops the unnecessary round_up() call for redzone_end.
With this change, the early SLUB cache annotation needs to be changed to
kasan_slab_alloc(), as kasan_kmalloc() doesn't unpoison objects now. The
number of poisoned bytes for objects in this cache stays the same, as
kmem_cache_node->object_size is equal to sizeof(struct kmem_cache_node).
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/7e3961cb52be380bc412860332063f5f7ce10d13.1612546384.git.andreyknvl@google.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com>
Cc: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>
Cc: Peter Collingbourne <pcc@google.com>
Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-02-26 09:19:59 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Save alloc info (if possible) for non-kmalloc() allocations. */
|
2022-09-06 05:05:18 +08:00
|
|
|
if (kasan_stack_collection_enabled() && !cache->kasan_info.is_kmalloc)
|
2022-09-06 05:05:34 +08:00
|
|
|
kasan_save_alloc_info(cache, tagged_object, flags);
|
kasan, mm: optimize kmalloc poisoning
For allocations from kmalloc caches, kasan_kmalloc() always follows
kasan_slab_alloc(). Currenly, both of them unpoison the whole object,
which is unnecessary.
This patch provides separate implementations for both annotations:
kasan_slab_alloc() unpoisons the whole object, and kasan_kmalloc() only
poisons the redzone.
For generic KASAN, the redzone start might not be aligned to
KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE. Therefore, the poisoning is split in two parts:
kasan_poison_last_granule() poisons the unaligned part, and then
kasan_poison() poisons the rest.
This patch also clarifies alignment guarantees of each of the poisoning
functions and drops the unnecessary round_up() call for redzone_end.
With this change, the early SLUB cache annotation needs to be changed to
kasan_slab_alloc(), as kasan_kmalloc() doesn't unpoison objects now. The
number of poisoned bytes for objects in this cache stays the same, as
kmem_cache_node->object_size is equal to sizeof(struct kmem_cache_node).
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/7e3961cb52be380bc412860332063f5f7ce10d13.1612546384.git.andreyknvl@google.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com>
Cc: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>
Cc: Peter Collingbourne <pcc@google.com>
Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-02-26 09:19:59 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return tagged_object;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2021-02-26 09:20:35 +08:00
|
|
|
static inline void *____kasan_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *cache,
|
|
|
|
const void *object, size_t size, gfp_t flags)
|
2018-12-28 16:29:45 +08:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
unsigned long redzone_start;
|
|
|
|
unsigned long redzone_end;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (gfpflags_allow_blocking(flags))
|
2021-02-25 04:05:05 +08:00
|
|
|
kasan_quarantine_reduce();
|
2018-12-28 16:29:45 +08:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (unlikely(object == NULL))
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
2021-02-26 09:19:21 +08:00
|
|
|
if (is_kfence_address(kasan_reset_tag(object)))
|
|
|
|
return (void *)object;
|
|
|
|
|
kasan, mm: optimize kmalloc poisoning
For allocations from kmalloc caches, kasan_kmalloc() always follows
kasan_slab_alloc(). Currenly, both of them unpoison the whole object,
which is unnecessary.
This patch provides separate implementations for both annotations:
kasan_slab_alloc() unpoisons the whole object, and kasan_kmalloc() only
poisons the redzone.
For generic KASAN, the redzone start might not be aligned to
KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE. Therefore, the poisoning is split in two parts:
kasan_poison_last_granule() poisons the unaligned part, and then
kasan_poison() poisons the rest.
This patch also clarifies alignment guarantees of each of the poisoning
functions and drops the unnecessary round_up() call for redzone_end.
With this change, the early SLUB cache annotation needs to be changed to
kasan_slab_alloc(), as kasan_kmalloc() doesn't unpoison objects now. The
number of poisoned bytes for objects in this cache stays the same, as
kmem_cache_node->object_size is equal to sizeof(struct kmem_cache_node).
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/7e3961cb52be380bc412860332063f5f7ce10d13.1612546384.git.andreyknvl@google.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com>
Cc: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>
Cc: Peter Collingbourne <pcc@google.com>
Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-02-26 09:19:59 +08:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* The object has already been unpoisoned by kasan_slab_alloc() for
|
2021-02-26 09:20:23 +08:00
|
|
|
* kmalloc() or by kasan_krealloc() for krealloc().
|
kasan, mm: optimize kmalloc poisoning
For allocations from kmalloc caches, kasan_kmalloc() always follows
kasan_slab_alloc(). Currenly, both of them unpoison the whole object,
which is unnecessary.
This patch provides separate implementations for both annotations:
kasan_slab_alloc() unpoisons the whole object, and kasan_kmalloc() only
poisons the redzone.
For generic KASAN, the redzone start might not be aligned to
KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE. Therefore, the poisoning is split in two parts:
kasan_poison_last_granule() poisons the unaligned part, and then
kasan_poison() poisons the rest.
This patch also clarifies alignment guarantees of each of the poisoning
functions and drops the unnecessary round_up() call for redzone_end.
With this change, the early SLUB cache annotation needs to be changed to
kasan_slab_alloc(), as kasan_kmalloc() doesn't unpoison objects now. The
number of poisoned bytes for objects in this cache stays the same, as
kmem_cache_node->object_size is equal to sizeof(struct kmem_cache_node).
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/7e3961cb52be380bc412860332063f5f7ce10d13.1612546384.git.andreyknvl@google.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com>
Cc: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>
Cc: Peter Collingbourne <pcc@google.com>
Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-02-26 09:19:59 +08:00
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*/
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/*
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|
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* The redzone has byte-level precision for the generic mode.
|
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* Partially poison the last object granule to cover the unaligned
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* part of the redzone.
|
|
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*/
|
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if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC))
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kasan_poison_last_granule((void *)object, size);
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/* Poison the aligned part of the redzone. */
|
2018-12-28 16:29:45 +08:00
|
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redzone_start = round_up((unsigned long)(object + size),
|
2020-12-23 04:00:24 +08:00
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|
KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE);
|
2021-02-26 09:20:27 +08:00
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redzone_end = round_up((unsigned long)(object + cache->object_size),
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KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE);
|
2021-02-25 04:05:05 +08:00
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kasan_poison((void *)redzone_start, redzone_end - redzone_start,
|
2022-05-13 11:23:08 +08:00
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KASAN_SLAB_REDZONE, false);
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2018-12-28 16:29:45 +08:00
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kasan, mm: optimize kmalloc poisoning
For allocations from kmalloc caches, kasan_kmalloc() always follows
kasan_slab_alloc(). Currenly, both of them unpoison the whole object,
which is unnecessary.
This patch provides separate implementations for both annotations:
kasan_slab_alloc() unpoisons the whole object, and kasan_kmalloc() only
poisons the redzone.
For generic KASAN, the redzone start might not be aligned to
KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE. Therefore, the poisoning is split in two parts:
kasan_poison_last_granule() poisons the unaligned part, and then
kasan_poison() poisons the rest.
This patch also clarifies alignment guarantees of each of the poisoning
functions and drops the unnecessary round_up() call for redzone_end.
With this change, the early SLUB cache annotation needs to be changed to
kasan_slab_alloc(), as kasan_kmalloc() doesn't unpoison objects now. The
number of poisoned bytes for objects in this cache stays the same, as
kmem_cache_node->object_size is equal to sizeof(struct kmem_cache_node).
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/7e3961cb52be380bc412860332063f5f7ce10d13.1612546384.git.andreyknvl@google.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com>
Cc: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>
Cc: Peter Collingbourne <pcc@google.com>
Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-02-26 09:19:59 +08:00
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/*
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* Save alloc info (if possible) for kmalloc() allocations.
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* This also rewrites the alloc info when called from kasan_krealloc().
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*/
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2022-09-06 05:05:18 +08:00
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if (kasan_stack_collection_enabled() && cache->kasan_info.is_kmalloc)
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2022-09-06 05:05:19 +08:00
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kasan_save_alloc_info(cache, (void *)object, flags);
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2018-12-28 16:29:45 +08:00
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kasan, mm: optimize kmalloc poisoning
For allocations from kmalloc caches, kasan_kmalloc() always follows
kasan_slab_alloc(). Currenly, both of them unpoison the whole object,
which is unnecessary.
This patch provides separate implementations for both annotations:
kasan_slab_alloc() unpoisons the whole object, and kasan_kmalloc() only
poisons the redzone.
For generic KASAN, the redzone start might not be aligned to
KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE. Therefore, the poisoning is split in two parts:
kasan_poison_last_granule() poisons the unaligned part, and then
kasan_poison() poisons the rest.
This patch also clarifies alignment guarantees of each of the poisoning
functions and drops the unnecessary round_up() call for redzone_end.
With this change, the early SLUB cache annotation needs to be changed to
kasan_slab_alloc(), as kasan_kmalloc() doesn't unpoison objects now. The
number of poisoned bytes for objects in this cache stays the same, as
kmem_cache_node->object_size is equal to sizeof(struct kmem_cache_node).
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/7e3961cb52be380bc412860332063f5f7ce10d13.1612546384.git.andreyknvl@google.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com>
Cc: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>
Cc: Peter Collingbourne <pcc@google.com>
Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-02-26 09:19:59 +08:00
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/* Keep the tag that was set by kasan_slab_alloc(). */
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return (void *)object;
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2019-02-21 14:19:01 +08:00
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}
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2020-12-23 04:03:10 +08:00
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void * __must_check __kasan_kmalloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, const void *object,
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size_t size, gfp_t flags)
|
2019-01-09 07:23:18 +08:00
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{
|
kasan, mm: optimize kmalloc poisoning
For allocations from kmalloc caches, kasan_kmalloc() always follows
kasan_slab_alloc(). Currenly, both of them unpoison the whole object,
which is unnecessary.
This patch provides separate implementations for both annotations:
kasan_slab_alloc() unpoisons the whole object, and kasan_kmalloc() only
poisons the redzone.
For generic KASAN, the redzone start might not be aligned to
KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE. Therefore, the poisoning is split in two parts:
kasan_poison_last_granule() poisons the unaligned part, and then
kasan_poison() poisons the rest.
This patch also clarifies alignment guarantees of each of the poisoning
functions and drops the unnecessary round_up() call for redzone_end.
With this change, the early SLUB cache annotation needs to be changed to
kasan_slab_alloc(), as kasan_kmalloc() doesn't unpoison objects now. The
number of poisoned bytes for objects in this cache stays the same, as
kmem_cache_node->object_size is equal to sizeof(struct kmem_cache_node).
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/7e3961cb52be380bc412860332063f5f7ce10d13.1612546384.git.andreyknvl@google.com
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Branislav Rankov <Branislav.Rankov@arm.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Evgenii Stepanov <eugenis@google.com>
Cc: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>
Cc: Peter Collingbourne <pcc@google.com>
Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2021-02-26 09:19:59 +08:00
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return ____kasan_kmalloc(cache, object, size, flags);
|
2019-01-09 07:23:18 +08:00
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}
|
2020-12-23 04:03:10 +08:00
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EXPORT_SYMBOL(__kasan_kmalloc);
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2018-12-28 16:29:45 +08:00
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2020-12-23 04:03:10 +08:00
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void * __must_check __kasan_kmalloc_large(const void *ptr, size_t size,
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2018-12-28 16:31:01 +08:00
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gfp_t flags)
|
2018-12-28 16:29:45 +08:00
|
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{
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unsigned long redzone_start;
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unsigned long redzone_end;
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if (gfpflags_allow_blocking(flags))
|
2021-02-25 04:05:05 +08:00
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kasan_quarantine_reduce();
|
2018-12-28 16:29:45 +08:00
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if (unlikely(ptr == NULL))
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return NULL;
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2021-02-26 09:20:03 +08:00
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/*
|
2022-03-25 09:10:31 +08:00
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* The object has already been unpoisoned by kasan_unpoison_pages() for
|
2021-02-26 09:20:23 +08:00
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* alloc_pages() or by kasan_krealloc() for krealloc().
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2021-02-26 09:20:03 +08:00
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*/
|
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/*
|
|
|
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* The redzone has byte-level precision for the generic mode.
|
|
|
|
* Partially poison the last object granule to cover the unaligned
|
|
|
|
* part of the redzone.
|
|
|
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*/
|
|
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if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC))
|
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kasan_poison_last_granule(ptr, size);
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/* Poison the aligned part of the redzone. */
|
2018-12-28 16:29:45 +08:00
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redzone_start = round_up((unsigned long)(ptr + size),
|
2020-12-23 04:00:24 +08:00
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KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE);
|
2021-02-26 09:20:03 +08:00
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redzone_end = (unsigned long)ptr + page_size(virt_to_page(ptr));
|
2021-02-25 04:05:05 +08:00
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kasan_poison((void *)redzone_start, redzone_end - redzone_start,
|
2021-04-30 13:59:59 +08:00
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KASAN_PAGE_REDZONE, false);
|
2018-12-28 16:29:45 +08:00
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return (void *)ptr;
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}
|
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2020-12-23 04:03:10 +08:00
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void * __must_check __kasan_krealloc(const void *object, size_t size, gfp_t flags)
|
2018-12-28 16:29:45 +08:00
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{
|
2021-10-04 21:46:46 +08:00
|
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struct slab *slab;
|
2018-12-28 16:29:45 +08:00
|
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if (unlikely(object == ZERO_SIZE_PTR))
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return (void *)object;
|
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|
2021-02-26 09:20:23 +08:00
|
|
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/*
|
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* Unpoison the object's data.
|
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* Part of it might already have been unpoisoned, but it's unknown
|
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* how big that part is.
|
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*/
|
2021-04-30 13:59:59 +08:00
|
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kasan_unpoison(object, size, false);
|
2021-02-26 09:20:23 +08:00
|
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|
2021-10-04 21:46:46 +08:00
|
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slab = virt_to_slab(object);
|
2018-12-28 16:29:45 +08:00
|
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|
2021-02-26 09:20:23 +08:00
|
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/* Piggy-back on kmalloc() instrumentation to poison the redzone. */
|
2021-10-04 21:46:46 +08:00
|
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if (unlikely(!slab))
|
2020-12-23 04:03:10 +08:00
|
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return __kasan_kmalloc_large(object, size, flags);
|
2018-12-28 16:29:45 +08:00
|
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else
|
2021-10-04 21:46:46 +08:00
|
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return ____kasan_kmalloc(slab->slab_cache, object, size, flags);
|
2018-12-28 16:29:45 +08:00
|
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}
|
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|
2021-02-25 04:05:50 +08:00
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bool __kasan_check_byte(const void *address, unsigned long ip)
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{
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if (!kasan_byte_accessible(address)) {
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kasan_report((unsigned long)address, 1, false, ip);
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return false;
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}
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return true;
|
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}
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