Doc: Final edits for the HLD-Security doc.
Signed-off-by: Deb Taylor <deb.taylor@intel.com>
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@ -196,8 +196,8 @@ securely.
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Guest Secure Boot with OVMF
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---------------------------
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Open Virtual Machine Firmware (OVMF) is an EDK II based project to enable UEFI
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support for virtual machines in virtualized environment. In ACRN, OVMF is
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deployed to launch a user VM, as if the user VM is booted on a machine with
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support for virtual machines in a virtualized environment. In ACRN, OVMF is
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deployed to launch a User VM, as if the User VM is booted on a machine with
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UEFI firmware.
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UEFI Secure Boot defines how a platform's firmware can authenticate a digitally
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@ -217,15 +217,15 @@ UEFI Secure Boot is already supported by OVMF.
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UEFI Secure Boot Overview
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UEFI Secure Boot is controlled by a set of UEFI Authenticated Variables which specify
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the UEFI Secure Boot Policy, the platform manufacturer or the platform owner enroll the
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policy objects, which include the n-tuple of keys {PK, KEK, db,dbx} as a step 1.
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the UEFI Secure Boot Policy; the platform manufacturer or the platform owner enroll the
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policy objects, which includes the n-tuple of keys {PK, KEK, db,dbx} as step 1.
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During each successive boot, the UEFI secure boot implementation will assess the
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policy in order to verify the signed images that are discovered in a host-bus adapter
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or on a disk. If the images pass policy, then they are invoked.
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UEFI Secure Boot implementations use these keys:
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#. Platform Key (PK) is the top-level key in Secure Boot, UEFI supports a single PK,
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#. Platform Key (PK) is the top-level key in Secure Boot; UEFI supports a single PK,
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which is generally provided by the manufacturer.
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#. Key Exchange Key (KEK) is used to sign Signature and Forbidden Signature Database updates.
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#. Signature Database (db) contains kyes and/or hashes of allowed EFI binaries.
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@ -241,9 +241,9 @@ In ACRN, User VM Secure Boot can be enabled by below steps.
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#. Generate keys(PK/KEK/DB) with key generation tool such as Ubuntu KeyGeneration,
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`PK.der`, `KEK.der` and `db.der` will be enrolled in UEFI BIOS, `db.key` and `db.crt`
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will be used to sign user VM bootloader/kernel.
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#. Create a virtual disk to hold `PK.der`, `KEK.der` and `db.der`, then launch user VM with
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#. Create a virtual disk to hold `PK.der`, `KEK.der` and `db.der`, then launch the User VM with
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this virtual disk which contains the keys for enrollment.
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#. Start OVMF in writeback mode to ensure the keys are persistently stored in the OVMF image.
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#. Start the OVMF in writeback mode to ensure the keys are persistently stored in the OVMF image.
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#. Enroll keys in OVMF GUI by following the Secure Boot configuration flow and enable
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secure boot mode.
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#. Perform writeback via reset in OVMF.
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@ -255,7 +255,7 @@ In ACRN, User VM Secure Boot can be enabled by below steps.
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Service VM Hardening
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--------------------
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In the ACRN project, the reference Service VM is based on Clear Linux OS.
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In the ACRN project, the reference Service VM is based on the Clear Linux OS.
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Customers may choose to use different open source OSes or their own
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proprietary OS systems. To minimize the attack surfaces and achieve the
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goal of "defense in depth", there are many common guidelines to ensure the
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